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Abstract
This thesis aims to study the macroeconomic performance of China. China has
been experiencing rapid economic growth and it has been changing gradually from
a planned to a market economy since it initiated the well known open door policy
combined with a coastal development strategy in 1978. However, rapid growth
has occurred on the background of increasing regional disparity. Meanwhile, unem-
ployment has increased signicantly during last two decades, and has become one
of the most pressing problems of the Chinese economy today. Moreover, another
major challenge facing the Chinese economy is how to deal with various shocks,
and to ensure the sustainability and balance of economic growth in the face of the
increasing economic uncertainties associated with its deep reform and integration
into the world trade and nancial system.
Based on the above concerns and literature review, this study, rstly, uses an aug-
mented Solow-Swan model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) to assess the role
FDI plays in underlying regional differences in economic growth across Chinese
provinces over the reform period 1978-2008. My analysis indicates that the aug-
mented Solow growth model appears to provide a good description of regional
growth patterns in China over the period 1978-2008 and the data display condi-
tional convergence. After controlling for FDI and other determinants of growth,
provinces that were initially poor tend to grow faster and the evidence in favour
of conditional convergence becomes even stronger after splitting the data into sub-
samples.
I then focus on the study of the relationship between unemployment and growth
at both national level and regional level in order to nd out how unemployment
affects China's economic growth and economic reform progress overall. I nd that
Okun's relationship does not hold in China universally and, furthermore, the nature
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of the observed relationship has changed during the transition progress. I argue
that there are hump shaped relationships both between growth and unemployment
and between the speed of transition and unemployment in China. The results are
consistent with several theoretical and empirical studies in the literature.
Finally, structural VARmethodology pioneered by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993)
is used to identify and decompose supply and demand shocks to two variables, (the
log of) output (annual real GDP) and (the log of) prices (annual GDP deator). I
then compute and discuss the correlation of such shocks across provinces and show
how it has evolved over the four main sub-periods of China's history. Moreover,
I investigate which factors contribute to economic integration or divergence in the
Chinese economy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Goals and Scope
The overriding goal of my thesis is to study how the macroeconomic performance of China,
a country which holds one fth of the global population, is changing during the transition
from central planning to market oriented economic system. During this transition, China
has been experiencing rapid economic growth, recently becoming the second largest econ-
omy globally. However, large chasms have opened up between regions. Urban areas in
Eastern and South-Eastern China are increasingly shaping up as relatively rich industri-
alized and middle-class economies. Most Central and Western China, in contract remain
relatively poor and underdeveloped. The regional disparities are further reinforced by the
continued enforcement of the hukou system of household registration which restricts the
ability of residents of poor and depressed areas to move. Whether or not China's economic
growth and social development can be sustained in the long run is hotly debated. My focus
in this thesis therefore is on the regional disparity on the background of rapid growth.
More concretely, the analysis focuses on the following questions: Why have some provinces
become so much richer than others in the wake of economic reform and what accounts for
the huge increases in real incomes over time? How can regional development be improved?
Will unemployment keep increasing? Unemployment has increased signicantly despite
high economic growth during last two decades, and has become one of the most press-
ing problems of the Chinese economy today. Will increasing unemployment undermine
China's economic development? Another major challenge facing China is how to prepare
to deal with various shocks and to ensure sustainable and balanced economic growth. China
is undergoing deep reform and integration into the world trade and nancial systems. This
17
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process it is likely to bring about more economic uncertainties. What drives business cycle
uctuations in China?
Although a comprehensive literature review is beyond the scope of this Chapter, it will be
instructive to explain the main theme of my thesis in the context of the growth and transition
literature.
1.2 Chinese Economic Reform Background
My thesis is most closely related with the following major reforms during economic tran-
sition.
1.2.1 Opening up the economy
Since 1949 the Chinese economy had been not only closed to the Western countries, but
also to the Eastern block. Until 1978, it has remained one of the most closed economies
in the world. Started from the late 1970s, China has implemented the well known open
door policy combined with a coastal development strategy. The government decided
to expand foreign trade and welcome foreign investment. Meanwhile, the central gov-
ernment decided to allow selected Eastern and South-Eastern coastal provinces to pursue
reform one step ahead of the other regions in the country. The vast majority of indus-
trial equipment imported from Western countries was allocated to the major coastal urban
areas which were thought to have better industrial foundation and favourable geographi-
cal position to absorb and make use of the investment. In addition, the central government
also allowed them to adopt special policies (teshu zhengce) and to implement exible
measures (linhuo cuoshi) (Zhou, 1984, as cited in Qian, 1999). This helped boost the eco-
nomic development and growth in the coastal provinces relative to inland provinces. Thus,
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the coastal regions began to outgrow the rest of country and interregional gaps in terms of
industrial output have been gradually widening (Tzeng, 1991).
1.2.2 Fiscal decentralization
Although some economic decentralization was implemented even before the economic re-
form, the Chinese economy remained highly centralized and tightly regulated whereby pro-
duction and resource allocation were carried out according to a plan designed by the central
government. In the late 1970s, after almost three decades of intense social movements, the
central government decided to decentralise administrative power and allow local authorities
and enterprises to retain part of their revenues. The purpose of this move was to reinvig-
orate the stagnant economy by encouraging local enthusiasm in production (Tang, 1998).
From 1979 to 1993, the central scal power gradually weakened: the central government's
share of expenditures (after revenue-sharing) declined from 51 percent to 28 percent (Ma
and Norregaard, 1998, as cited in cited in Poncet and Barthélemy, 2008, p.899). The scal
decentralization gave local governments the authority and incentives to develop their lo-
cal economies and promoted fast growth of the Chinese economy in the last three decades.
However, some locals have implemented protectionist policies, supposedly to develop local
industry (Bai, 1981).
1.2.3 Privatization and Restructuring State-owned Enterprises
The process of economic transition has had a signicant impact on the urban labor market
in China. Privatization and restructuring of large state-owned enterprises has been tak-
ing place since 1995. China, like other former communist countries, started its transition
from a situation of permanent full- employment. After the reform of urban employment
system was accomplished and the iron-rice-bowl was broken, labor allocation became
mostly market-based. Unemployment in urban areas emerged during the period of privati-
zation and restructuring of state-owned enterprises in the late 1990s (Cai and Wang, 2010).
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Meanwhile, privatization of small state-owned enterprises mushroomed, encouraged under
the policy of grasping the large and letting go of the small (Zhua da fang xiao). Un-
til the end of 1996, up to 70 percent of small state-owned enterprises had been privatized
in pioneering provinces3 and around half were privatized in many other provinces (Qian,
1999).
1.3 Overview and Structure
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explores the impact of FDI on Chinese eco-
nomic growth in order to study the factors underlying China's regional disparities and lack
of convergence. In Chapter 3, the main consideration is how unemployment will affect
China's economic growth and economic reform progress overall. Chapter 4 assesses the
business cycle' synchronization and analyzes the factors that drive this synchronization-
Next, I discuss each chapter in more detail.
In Chapter 2, I explore the impact of foreign direct investment on growth, using a panel
of Chinese provincial data spanning 1978-2008. I estimate an augmented Solow growth
model inspired by Mankiw et al. (1992, MRW henceforth) which relates output growth to
investment in human and physical capital and population growth. My motivation is that
only a few empirical studies did attempt to analyze China's recent growth experience (see,
for example, Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Li et al., 1998). My research extends Chen and
Fleisher's (1996) and Li et al.'s (1998) analyses. I examine whether the gap in economic
development between regions has narrowed or widened following the liberalization and
what what role regional distribution of FDI inows has played. In addition, the sample
is split into three geographic sub groups (East, Central and West) to further examine if
convergence within broader regions is faster given the similar economic background and
similar macroeconomic policies.
3 Privatization of state-owned enterprises started initially by local governments as experiments in a few
provinces, such as Shangdong, Guangdong, and Sichuan (Qian, 1999, p.21).
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My nding indicates that the augmented Solow-Swan model ts the Chinese data very
well. I nd that FDI has a positive and statistically signicant impact on economic growth,
as theory predicts. The investment and labor-force growth rate and human capital are also
signicant and have the expected signs.
Chapter 3 adopts panel-data approach to test whether Okun's type relation holds in China.
The sample is further divided into two sub-periods, to investigate the interaction between
the unemployment and growth. There are only a few previous studies on this issue and those
restricted their attention to the relationship between growth and unemployment in China at
the aggregate level and they ignore the regional aspects of this relationship. However,
the progress of reform has been uneven and the benets of economic reform differ across
regions. Therefore, an examination at the regional level is as important and interesting as
the aggregate level analysis.
My key ndings are: Firstly, Okun's law does not hold in China universally, and the nature
of the relationship has changed during the transition progress. The differences in the nature
of the relationship between growth and unemployment may be driven by the uneven pattern
of Chinese economic development. The coastal areas of the Eastern region were exposed to
reform measures and the market economy much earlier than the interior areas of the Central
and especially Western region. This would explain also why Okun's relationship can be
found in the later sub-period but not during the earlier one and it is in line with the results
of Izyumov and Vahaly (2002). Secondly, there is a hump shaped relationship between
growth and unemployment in China and the empirical evidence is consistent with the theory
put forward by Aghion and Howitt (1994) who analyze two competing effects of growth
on unemployment, one is the capitalisation effect and another is the creative destruction
effect. Moreover, the results indicate that the creative destruction effect should dominate
in China. Thirdly, the link between the speed of transition and unemployment in China
also displays an inverted U shaped relationship which provides strong empirical evidence
to the theory of Aghion and Blanchard (1994). To the best of my knowledge, this is the
rst time that this theory has been tested empirically. Meanwhile, Aghion and Blanchard
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(1994) theory, together with my empirical results, tell us that the current unemployment
rate is necessary and unavoidable. It should help facilitate China's transition and economic
reform. Short-term hardship thus will be outweighed by long- term economic gain (Valev,
2004).
Chapter 4 investigates the changing nature of business-cycle synchronization in China or, in
other words, economic integration among Chinese provinces based on provincial level data
divided into four uneven sub-periods reecting the different phases of China's economic re-
form. The analytical approach is based on identifying shocks affecting the various regions
and then computing the correlations of such shocks, using the structural VAR methodology
pioneered by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). This analytical framework is motivated by
the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (Mundell, 1961) and its emphasis on the impor-
tance of asymmetric shocks for the viability of integration. Importantly, the structural VAR
methodology allows us to distinguish between shocks that affect both output and the price
level permanently (usually denoted as supply shocks in this literature) and those affect-
ing output only temporarily while having a permanent price-level effect (demand shocks).
The analysis does not stop at merely documenting the correlation of permanent and tem-
porary shocks among Chinese regions. I also seek to explain the correlations of perma-
nent/temporary shocks by relating them to the factors that proxy for the vulnerability of
regions to idiosyncratic shocks as well as those that reect the channels allowing the ef-
fects of such shocks to spill over regions' boundaries: the distance between the regions,
dummy variables for adjacency, interior provinces adjacent with coastal provinces and be-
longing to the same broader region, economic size of regions, endowments of physical and
human capital, infrastructure, structure of economic activity in each region, openness to
(foreign) trade, foreign direct investment and economic policy. This allows me to assess
which factors contribute to economic convergence or divergence in the Chinese economy.
Few previous studies explored the determinants of Chinese economic business cycles at
provincial level.
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My key ndings are: First, the degree of bilateral cross correlation of supply shocks has
declined recently, which suggests a fall in the cohesion between Chinese regions. How-
ever, the bilateral cross correlation of demand shocks has increased, which in turn suggests
a greater degree of cohesion. Second, under the central planning economic system, the
variables I consider in my study do not explain the correlation of supply shocks across
provinces in China. Third, distance between two provinces is robustly correlated with a
higher cross provinces correlation of demand shock in the early period (1966-1977). With
the development of electric railways which started from 1958, the effect of distance fades
away. Fourth, two variables were found to be robust factors explaining the correlation of
supply shocks across provinces during the recent two period of 1978-1991 and 1992-2007:
coastal provinces and those with higher xed asset investment are characterized by higher
correlation of supply shocks. Fifth, greater similarity in production structure is not robustly
correlated with correlation of supply or demand shocks. Although it is signicant in the
univariate regression and has positive relationship with the correlation of demand shocks
during the period 1992-2007, the signicance disappears when other explanatory variables
are added. This is in line with the nding of Baxter and Kouparitas (2005) who also can-
not nd robust effect of industrial structure based on over 100 countries. Sixth, I do not
nd any link between scal policy coordination and the correlation of supply and demand
shocks. This nding is in line with the empirical ndings of Clark and van Wincoop (2001)
who conjecture that it could be an indirect link through the effect of common policies on
trade.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
In summary, my study supports the hypotheses that China's regional growth can be charac-
terized as a process of conditional convergence. It suggests that the gap can be reduced by
polices to help lagging provinces catch up with more developed provinces. Also very im-
portant, our nding indicates that government does not need worry about unemployment
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too much as this unemployment is necessary to achieve the optimal speed of transition and
it leads future prosperity. However, government should pay more attention to regional de-
velopment and reduce regional disparity as disparity can undermine the sustainability of
economic growth. Moreover, some studies argue that scal and administrative decentral-
ization lead to economic market divergence in China, but it is not conrmed by my study.
However, the study shows that coastal provinces are characterized by higher correlation
of supply shocks and higher cross provinces' correlation of supply shocks with similar
capital/xed-asset investment. From the initial stages of reform till now, coastal provinces
beneted a lot by public investment and policy priority.
Chapter 2
Foreign Direct Investment and Regional
Growth in China
2.1 Introduction
China has experienced rapid economic growth since the economic reforms of the late 1970s
and early 1980s. During this period it has, among other things, liberalized domestic agri-
cultural markets, international trade and nance and switched the emphasis of industrial
policy from heavy to light manufacturing (Anderson et al., 1985, p.65). Moreover, despite
signs that growth has been abating somewhat recently, China is still widely expected to
continue growing at around 10%. However, rapid growth has occurred on the background
of increasing regional disparities. For example, Demurger et al. (2002) nd that the growth
is fastest and slowest growing provinces differ by 6.2 percentage points during the period
1979-1998.
Started from the late 1970s, China has implemented the well known open door policy
combined with a coastal development strategy; the latter gave the coastal areas a special
role and economic autonomy. The vast majority of industrial equipment imported from
Western countries was allocated to the major costal urban areas which were thought to
have better industrial foundation and favorable geographical position to absorb and make
use of the investment (Tzeng, 1991). This helped boost the economic development and
growth in the coastal provinces relative to inland provinces (Tzeng, 1991). As a result, the
coastal region began to outgrow the rest of the country and interregional gaps in terms of
industrial output have been gradually widening.
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Regional disparities and convergence have received considerable attention in the context of
European countries and the US. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), and Rodwin and Sazanami
(1988, 1991) examined the regional economic disparities as well as convergence in the
United States and compared it with other groups of countries and regions. From the within-
country point of view, the issue was addressed by Lee, Pesaran, and Smith (1998) who
advocated heterogeneity in the growth rate of convergence; they point out that because
countries differ in their rates of population growth, technological progress and depreciation,
they may also display different convergence rates. However, in most of previous literature
on economic growth and convergence, the experience of China is rarely mentioned.
A few empirical studies did attempt to analyze China's recent growth experience based on
Solow model (see, for example, Chen & Fleshier, 1996; Li et al., 1998).Chen & Fleshier
(1996) and Li et al. (1998) use cross-section and panel data on Chinese provinces over the
reform period 1978-1993, 1978-1995, respectively, Chen & Fleshier argue that results are
quite close based on the original Solow model. Li et al. (1998) nd that an augmented
Solow-Swan model of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) provides a fairly good description
of cross-section data but works poorly in the panel-data framework. They also nd that
foreign direct investment inows seem to boost economic growth at the provincial level.
Wei (2002) similarly nd that industrial growth is positively associated with export and
foreign direct investment. Indeed, in the three decades since economic reform began in
China, the foreign-owned sector experienced rapid growth and amazing success. China has
become a major recipient of foreign direct investment. In 1993, China was the destination
of more foreign direct investment than any other developing country (The World Bank,
1994). In 1999 China ranked third in attracting FDI among all the countries and regions
in the world (Chow, 2002). A further surge in FDI preceded and accompanied China's
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, promoting China to
top position as an FDI destination in 2003. China appears to have beneted from a pattern
of capital inows heavily tilted toward FDI4.
4 Table in Appendix shows the unusually high share of FDI in the composition of China's capital inows.
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FDI is widely believed to be benecial to the recipient countries as it not only serves as a
capital injection to the domestic market but also plays as a central role for technological
spillover and advancement of managerial skills. However, its effect remains controversial
due to the use of different samples and various methodologies. Aitken and Harrison (1999)
use panel data on Venezuela. However, they found little evidence supporting the existence
of technology `spillovers' from foreign rms to domestic rms which might be the level of
foreign investment in Venezuela is too low and the economy not sufciently diversied to
receive large benets from foreign presence. They also mention that the scope for spillovers
might be greater in the export-oriented economies in East Asia. Comparing the economic
experience of China and Russia, Sachs and Woo (1994) emphasize that 40% of FDI5 in
China are from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan during the sample period. They argue that
this tends to facilitate FDI spillovers as the investors from these regions have additional
advantages of geographical proximity, same culture, same language and even family ties,
which played a critical role in China's economic development.
The objective of this chapter therefore is to explore the impact of foreign direct investment
on growth, using a panel of Chinese provincial data spanning 1978-2008. We estimate the
augmented Solow-Swan growth model of Mankiw et al. (1992, MRW henceforth) which
relates output growth to investment in human and physical capital and population growth. It
extends Chen & Fleshier (1996)'s and Li et al (1998)'s study since Human capital and FDI
are not included in Chen & Fleshier (1996)'s panel approach study and Physical capital,
and population growth are insignicant and human capital gets opposite sign in Li et al
(1998). In this study, to examine whether the gap is narrowed or widened with a major
step forward occurring following Deng Xiaoping's South Trip in 19926 (Fleisher et al,
5 In Appendix shows the share of utilized FDI by source based on available data. Much of this is believed
to be round-tripping through Hong Kong in order to evade taxes
6 From January 8 to February 21, 1992, Deng Xiaoping paid an inspection tour to south China such as
Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai, in that order. During his trip, the former Chinese leader made
important speeches and offered answers to a series of important theoretical and conceptual questions and
he stressed that planning and market forces are not essential difference between socialism and capitalism,
among others. It played a crucial role in guiding and accelerating China's reform and opening-up as well as
the socialist modernization process.
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2009). In addition, the sample will be split into three sub groups (East, Central and West)
to examine if convergence within the same region is faster, given the similar economic
background and similar macroeconomic policies.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief survey of litera-
ture. Section 3 introduces the augmented Solow-Swanmodel with foreign direct investment
that we estimate. Section 4 introduces the data and empirical methodology. In Section 5,
we rst show how leaving out foreign direct investment affects the coefcients on physical
capital investment, population growth and human capital, and then split the samples into
three sub-groups to investigate club convergence. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
The empirical approach is based on the theoretical contributions of Solow (1956) and Swan
(1956). They assume a standard neoclassical production function with decreasing returns
to capital. Their model predicts that output per worker is increasing in the savings rate
and decreasing in the growth rate of the labor force. When the economy is away from its
steady state, the convergence rate depends positively on the savings rate and negatively on
the labor-force growth rate. Because of decreasing returns, economies tend to converge
eventually to a steady state (however, because countries may have different savings rates
and labor-force growth rates, they may converge to different steady states).
The Solow-Swan model has been criticized as arbitrary and too simplistic and eventually
was challenged by the advent of endogenous growth theory (Romer 1986, Lucas 1988).
Endogenous growth theory relaxes the restriction posed by diminishing returns or at least
allows that the limit of the marginal product of capital does not tend towards zero. Because
of their research advantage, it is possible for richer nations to maintain long-run rates of
income growth that exceed those of poorer nations, implying cross-national divergence
rather than convergence.
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Since the mid-1980s, research on economic growth has experienced a new boom. The lit-
erature on growth and convergence has proceeded through several stages. First, Baumol
(1986) and others report nding convergence among groups of countries included in Mad-
dison's (1982) sample (Maddison, 1982 cited in Islam, 1995) and put forward the term
convergence club to express this phenomenon. These countries tend to converge both to
similar steady state levels of per capita income and to similar rates of growth. This notion
of convergence later came to be known as absolute convergence. A popular criterion for
judging whether countries are in their steady states is to study the correlation between ini-
tial levels of income and subsequent growth rates. The negative correlation is considered
as evidence of convergence in terms of both income levels and growth rates (Islam, 1995).
Next, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and MRW put forward the concept of conditional
convergence and argue that the evidence on the failure of per capita income to converge
does not contradict the Solow-Swan model. They emphasize that the growth theory need
not imply that all countries reach identical steady state levels of income. In equilibrium,
differences in countries' per capita incomes are likely to remain, because of differences in
labor markets, industrial structure and natural-resource endowments.
In addition, MRW show that the Solow-Swan model augmented to include human capital
in addition to physical capital and population growth provides a good t for cross-country
data. They stress the importance of human capital for growth. Including human capital
can potentially alter the theoretical modeling or the empirical analysis of economic growth
(1992, MRW, p.415). The augmented Solow model predicts that differences in savings,
education and labor-force growth should have a long way to go in explaining the cross-
country differences in income per capita. Their examination of the data indicates that these
three variables indeed explain most of the cross-country variation.
Third, Knight et al. (1993) and Islam (1995) extend MRW's analysis to panel-data frame-
work. An important advantage of analyzing growth in a panel setting is that one can account
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for country-specic effects such as allowing for differences in the aggregate production
function across economies.
Islam (1995) nds that adoption of the panel-data approach leads to a twofold change in
the results compared with the cross-section approach. First, he obtains much higher rates
of convergence. Second, he obtains lower values of the elasticity of output with respect to
capital. To this extent, the conventional cross-section estimates presented by MRWmay be
biased.
However, as Barro (1996) points out, the panel-data approach is not perfect. It may in-
troduce unwanted business cycle effects and exacerbate the effects of measurement errors.
Griliches and Mairesse (1995) suggest that it can be resolved by proxying for the unob-
served xed effects, which leaves more identifying variance in the regressor.
A natural fourth stage in the literature, Lee, Pesaran, and Smith (1995, 1998) extend the
use of the panel data approach to allow for heterogeneity of growth rates across countries in
consistent estimation of the speed of convergence coefcient. The question whether coun-
tries have the same steady state growth rate remains controversial (see Romer's comment
on Mankiw's paper in Mankiw, 1995).
However, the linear models cannot explain the convergence performance in different in-
come regimes well. The best way is the nonlinear mechanism whereby the speed of con-
vergence depends on initial per-capita income. Durlauf and Johnston (1995) split the MRW
sample using 1960 income and literacy rates and present a regression tree model to test the
multiple regimes in cross-country nonlinear growth behavior. They allow heterogeneity in
the speed of convergence for different groups of countries, with the grouping determined
endogenously and nd that technology parameters vary across the samples, suggesting that
the assumption of a common technology is a poor one. Temple (1998) also questions the
MRW's ndings. He nds largely disparate coefcient estimates across the sub samples,
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some of which imply the absence of convergence. In particular, he shows that estimated
technology parameters and convergence rates are highly sensitive to measurement error.
A number of studies focused on the subject of convergence within countries. Rodwin
(1988) and Sazanami (1991) did an empirical study of the United States and some European
countries. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) reported evidence for convergence in the U.S.
and compared it with other groups of countries and regions.
So far there have been only a few empirical studies that have attempted to explain China's
recent growth experience by Solow-Swan model. Wei (1992, cited in Li et al., 1998) found
that industrial growth was positively associated with export and foreign direct investment
by using two samples of city-level data. Chen and Fleisher (1996) found that convergence
in per capita production across China's provinces from 1978-1993 is conditional on phys-
ical investment, employment growth, human capital investment and foreign direct invest-
ment based on cross section methodology. Li et al.'s (1998) extended Chen and Fleisher's
study. Their results, nevertheless, are broadly similar. In addition, they found that regional
economies show convergence both conditionally and unconditionally over the reform pe-
riod. However, the goodness of t is considerably poorer in the panel data framework.
There is strong evidence of conditional convergence in the xed-effect model, but when
random effects are assumed, there is no evidence of conditional convergence.
2.3 The Model
We begin by briey reviewing the Solow growth model. The growth model has been widely
used as a theoretical framework for understanding cross-country growth patterns. Then we
introduce the augmented Solow growth model with human capital and foreign direct invest-
ment. The augmented Solow growth model with human capital is developed by Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992), hereafter MRW. The version of Solow augmented to include hu-
man capital and inows of foreign direct investments are suggested by Li et al. (1998).
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2.3.1 The textbook Solow model7
The Solow growth model assumes diminishing returns to capital and takes the rates of
saving, population growth and technological progress as exogenous. The Cobb-Douglas
production function with constant returns to scale can be written as:
Y = KAL1 ; 0 <  < 1 (2.1)
where, Y is output, K is capital, L is labor, A is knowledge or the effectiveness of
labor and  is the share of capital. L and A are assumed to grow exogenously at rates n
and g; respectively, so that
Lt = L0e
nt (2.2)
At = A0e
gt (2.3)
The model assumes that a constant fraction of output is invested or saved. Dening out-
put and the stock of capital per effective unit of labor as y = Y=AL, and k = K=AL,
respectively, the evolution of k is obtained by
_k = sy   (n+ g + )k = sk   (n+ g + )k (2.4)
where  is the rate of depreciation. Equation (2.4) implies that k converges to its steady
state value k
7 The formal derivation of the Solow model in this subsection follows MRW(1992)
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k = (
s
n+ g + 
)
1
1  (2.5)
substituting Equation (2.5) into the production function and taking logs, we nd the steady-
state income per capita is
ln(
Y 
L
) = lnA0 + gt+

1  ln(s) 

1  ln(n+ g + ) (2.6)
This equation shows how differing labor force growth rate, accumulation of physical cap-
ital and technological progress can explain the differences in per capita incomes across
countries.
MRW assume the rate of technological progress, g, and the rate of depreciation is constant
for all across countries. However, theA0 term captures not just technology but resource en-
dowments, climate, institutions and so on, It may therefore differ across provinces (MRW,
1992). They, therefore, postulat that
lnA0 = a+ " (2.7)
Where a is a constant and " is the country-specic shift or shock term (MRW, 1992).
Then the empirical specication of steady-state income per capita is
ln(
Y 
L
) = +

1  ln(s) 

1  ln(n+ g + ) + " (2.8)
Equation (2.8) assumes that all countries are currently in their steady states or that de-
partures from steady states are random across countries. However, regional economies of
China are out of their steady states. It is therefore also necessary to examine the dynamic
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evolution of regional economies along transition to their steady states, namely a phenom-
enon that is called conditional convergence. Without special point out, the convergence
discussed in this chapter henceforth is conditional -convergence.
Discussing regional economic growth, there are two concepts of convergence in the classi-
cal literature (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). They are -convergence and -convergence. We say
that there is absolute -convergence if poor economies tend to grow faster than rich ones.
The concept of -convergence can be dened as follows: a group of economies are -
converging if the dispersion of their real per capita GDP levels tends to decrease over time
(Sala-i-Martin, 1996, p.1020). -convergence relates to whether or not the cross-country
distribution of world income shrinks over time. In the Solow-Swan version of the neo-
classical model, countries would reach their respective steady states. Hence, in looking
for convergence in a cross-country study, it is necessary to control for the differences in
steady states of different countries. This is the concept known in the classical literature
(Sala-I-Martin, 1992) as conditional -convergence.
Let y be the steady-state level of income per effective labour given by Equation (2.8), and
let yt be the actual value at time t. Approximating around the steady state, the speed of
convergence is given by
dln (yt)
dt
=  [ln(y)  ln (yt)] (2.9)
Where,  is the rate of convergence, given by  = (n+ g + )(1  ) and it implies that
ln (yt) = (1  e t)ln(y) + e tln (y0) (2.10)
Where y0 is income per effective worker at some initial date. Subtracting lny0 from both
sides,
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ln (yt)  ln (y0) =  (1  e t)ln (y0) + (1  e t) 1  ln(s)
 (1  e t) 
1  ln(n+ g + )
(2.11)
Equation (2.11) is formulated in terms of income per effective labour; it has to be reformu-
lated in terms of income per worker. Substituting the following expression for income per
effective labour
ln (yt) = ln

Yt
Lt

  ln (A0)  gt (2.12)
yields
ln

Yt
Lt

  ln

Y0
L0

=  ln

Y0
L0

+  
1  ln(s)
  
1  ln(n+ g + ) + ln (A0) + gt
(2.13)
Where  = 1   e t ,  is the speed of convergence8. Equation (2.13) represents the
dynamics of a country's growth rate towards the steady state.
2.3.2 The augmented Solow model with human capital and foreign
direct investment9
In order to capture the explicit role of human capital in determining economic growth,
MRW augmented the Solow model by including accumulation of human capital in addition
to physical capital.
Li et al. (1998) pointed out that FDI can foster technological progress at least in two
ways. On the one hand, it enables inow of foreign techniques and management expertise
and reduces the costs of domestic innovation. On the other hand, it benets not only the
8 More detailed derivation is in the Appendix.
9 The derivation of the model with FDI follows Li et al. (1998)
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company concerned, but also other rms, as the importation of foreign techniques has spill-
over effects.
The Cobb-Douglas production function is specied as
Y = KHAL1  ; 0 <  +  < 1 (2.14)
Where H is the stock of human capital,  is the share of human capital in total output, and
all other variables are dened as before. It assumed  +  < 1 so that there are constant
returns to scale and diminishing returns to each factor of input.
Labour and technology are assumed to grow according to the following functions:
Lt = L0e
nt (2.15)
At = A0e
gtF  (2.16)
F is the degree of openness of the regional economy to foreign countries, and  is the
elasticity of technical progress with respect to openness. MRW assumed that the fractions
of income invested in physical capital and human capital are constant at the rates of sk and
sh respectively, and that both types of capital depreciate at a common rate . The evolution
of the economy is derived by
_k = sky   (n+ g + )k = skkh   (n+ g + )k (2.17)
_h = shy   (n+ g + )h = shkh   (n+ g + )h (2.18)
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Steady state is given by
k = (
s1 k s

h
n+ g + 
)
1
1   (2.19)
h = (
sks
1 
h
n+ g + 
)
1
1   (2.20)
Substituting Equations (2.19) and (2.20) into the production function and taking logs, we
obtain the steady-state income per capita:
ln

Yt
Lt

= ln (A0) + gt+
+
1   ln(n+ g + ) +

1   ln(sk)
+ 
1   ln(sh) + ln (F )
(2.21)
Approximating around the steady state, MRW and Li et al. (1998) show that the growth
rate of output per worker in this model is given by
ln

Yt
Lt

  ln

Y0
L0

=  ln

Y0
L0

+  
1   ln(sk) + 

1   ln(sh)
  +
1   ln(n+ g + ) + ln (A0) + gt+ ln (F )
(2.22)
where  is the rate of convergence  = (n+ g + )(1    )
MRW also present an alternative way to express the role of human capital in determining
economic growth.
ln( Yt
Lt
)  ln( Y0
L0
) =  ln( Y0
L0
) +  
1   ln(sk)   1   ln(n+ g + )
+ 
1   ln(h
) + ln (A0) + gt+ lnF
(2.23)
Equation (2.22) is the reduced form of the augmented model. Equation (2.23) adds the
level of human capital ln(h) to the right-hand side. They predict different coefcients for
the saving rate and population growth terms.
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2.4 Data and empirical methodology
2.4.1 Data and sample
In this chapter, the units of analysis are the individual provinces of China and the period of
analysis is from 1978 to 2008. This period was chosen because the Chinese economic re-
forms were initiated in 1978. The data are available in annual frequency. Annual frequency,
however, may be too short to be appropriate for studying growth convergence because of
short-term disturbances (Islam, 1995). Following Islam (1995), we therefore split the sam-
ple into ve-year intervals. Hence, considering the period 1978-2008, we have ve data
points for each province: 2008, 2003, 1998, 1993, 1988, and 1983. When t = 1983, for ex-
ample, t   1 is 1978. Regional data set is classied by geography into EAST, CENTRAL
and WEST shows in Table 2.1. However, data are not available for some provinces; thus,
we exclude Chongqing and Tibet. One important question when testing the Solow growth
model is whether to use per capita or per worker variables. In line with the Solow growth
model it seems more appropriate to use per worker GDP and the growth of the labor force,
because the model is based on a production function and not every person contributes to
production.
Y stands for the real gross provincial product in a particular year. L is the working-age
population in that year. Y=L is the real GDP per worker. Following MRW and Islam
(1995) we proxy the saving rate, sk, by the ratio of aggregate investment to GDP, and h10
by secondary and higher education enrolment rates (i.e. the ratio of the total secondary
and higher education enrolment to the employment). The growth rate of employment n is
derived from the formula: Lt+5=Lt = (1 + n)5 . To measure the provincial openness to
foreign investment, we use take the ratio of the foreign direct investment to GDP (Fi =
10 Gemmell (1996) and Temple (1999) argued that school enrolment rates may conate human capital stock
and accumulation effects. MRW(1992) point out that which augmented Solow model be used is based on the
available data corresponds more closely to the rate of accumulation or the level of human capital. Our data is
more close to the level of human capital by restricted regression.
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t+5X
t
FDIi;t
t+5X
t
GDPi;t
). We follow Islam (1995) and MRW in assuming that technological progress
and the depreciation rate are constant and that they sum to 0.05. We use the laborforce
to compute ln(n + g + ). All the data come from `Comprehensive Statistical Data and
Materials: 50 Years of New China' and Statistical Bureau of China.
2.4.2 Empirical methodology
We apply panel data approach rather than cross-section regressions since it is possible to
control for the unobserved province-specic effects by treating initial efciency as a time-
invariant xed effect and eliminating its inuence through a time dimensional transforma-
tion. Though an important assumption of the Solow growth model and augmented Solow
growth model is that all the explanatory variables are exogenous, Caselle et al. (1996)
argue that the endogeneity of within-group estimator may also provide biased and incon-
sistent estimates in a dynamic panel data model. They advocate the use of panel data and
generalized method of moments (GMM). However, Bond et al. (2001) claim that it can also
make serious bias on the initial income term created by the rst-difference GMM estima-
tor when the weak instruments of lagged levels of the variables are adopted. Based on the
available data, I apply LSDV (least square with dummy variables) and EGLS (Estimated
Generalized Least Squares)11.
The growth equation (2.23) can be generalized in the following panel data model
ln

Yi;t
Li;t

  ln

Yi;t 1
Li;t 1

= 0 + 1ln(nit + g + ) + 2ln (skit) + 3ln (h
)
+4ln (Fit) + 5ln

Yi;t 1
Li;t 1

+ t + i + it
(2.24)
11 When I use LSDV and EGLS for the estimations, the results should not be biased by endogeity issue since
there is no correlation be found between the error term and the independent variables.
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5 = e
 t   1
i = (1  e t)ln (A0)
t = g(t2   e tt1)
where, it is the transitory error term. It captures province-specic and time invariant
effect. In this chapter, h is level of human capital.
2.5 Estimation Results and Interpretation
The question we consider in our empirical analysis is twofold. Fist, we are interested in
nding whether the data support the augmented Solow-Swan model's predictions about the
determinants of economic growth. Second, we want to shed some light on the role played
by foreign direct investment in fuelling Chinese growth since 1978 and in giving rise to
the growing inter-regional disparities. All reported results in this section are based on the
augmented Solow model as shown by Equation (2.24).
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.2 report the results of xed- and random-effects models
based on whole sample, respectively, without including foreign direct investment. The
Hausman-test statistic of 26.18 suggests that we should reject the random-effects model in
favor of the xed-effects model. Therefore, our discussion below will focus on the results
of the xed-effects model.
All variables are signicant at the 1% or 5% level and have the expected sign. The co-
efcient of human capital investment is positive, physical capital investment is positive
and labor-force growth is negative as expected. Regional economic growth is positively
related to investment in physical capital and human capital and negatively related to labor-
force growth. The fact that the coefcient on initial logGDP per worker is -0.053 indicates
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conditional convergence. Thus, controlling for the differences in the steady-state across
provinces, poor provinces would tend to grow faster than rich ones. As far as the steady-
states determinants are concerned, the augmented Solow growth model implies that the sum
of coefcient of ln(g + h + ) and sk is equal to zero. In order to check if the coefcients
are consistent with the economic theory, we further examine it by estimating a restricted
regression (we use the Wald test for restriction, see Table 2.3 model 1). The F-statistic for
the restriction of p value is 0.25. Hence, the validity of the restriction cannot be rejected at
5% signicant level.
ln

Yt
Lt

  ln

Yt 1
Lt 1

= 0:6634  0:0439ln

Yt 1
Lt 1

+ 0:2014(ln(sk)
 ln(n+ g + )) + 0:1149ln(h)
(2.25)
The regression yields the adjusted R2 is 0.58, signicant at 1% level. In this model e t  
1 =  0:0439, so that we can again conrm conditional convergence.
We now turn to the question what happens when foreign direct investment per capita is
brought into the analysis. At the empirical level, the introduction of foreign direct invest-
ment can alter the analysis of cross-province differences: in the rst set of regressions,
foreign direct investment is an omitted variable. The results with xed- and random-effects
are shown in column (3) and (4) of Table 2.2, respectively. In this model, the Hausman
test yields a statistic of 25.56 and we again reject the random-effects specication. Our
discussion below is still based on the results of the xed-effect model.
Foreign direct investment measure enters signicantly in the regression. It reduces the size
of the coefcient on physical capital investment and increases the coefcient of human cap-
ital somewhat. Moreover, the inclusion of foreign direct investment improves the overall
t of the regression. The remaining variables in the regression strongly support the aug-
mented Solow growth model. To check if the coefcient is consistent with the theory, we
estimate the restricted regression again(see Table 2.3 model 2). The restriction that the co-
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efcients on ln(sk) and ln(n + g + ) , and sum to zero is not rejected by the Wald test at
5% signicant level.
ln

Yt
Lt

  ln

Yt 1
Lt 1

= 1:1856  0:0786ln

Yt 1
Lt 1

+ 0:1767(ln(sk)  ln(n+ g + ))
+0:1846ln(h) + 0:0137ln(F )
(2.26)
The adjusted R2 is increased to 0.64, signicant at 1% level. In this model, e t   1 =
 0:0786 this again suggests conditional convergence at the provincial level in China. The
implied speed of convergence, , is 0.01638, which means 1.638% of gap of income per
capita between regional economies vanishes every year if their steady states are identical.
The half-life of convergence, namely the time that it takes for half the initial gap to be elim-
inated, is about 42 years. Islam (1995) found convergence rates ranging between 0.038 and
0.091 (the latter obtained for a sample including only OECD countries). Although our
estimate of the speed of convergence is lower than Islam's, we need to consider that for
much of the analyzed period, China was a tightly regulated and centrally planned develop-
ing economy. With that in mind, the speed of convergence appears rather high. Finally, we
estimate the elasticity of the physical investment to output, ;is approximately 0.69.
We can extend the analysis further by splitting the sample. In an important paper, Durlauf
and Johnson (1995) split the MRW sample using 1960 income and literacy rates. They
found evidence that technology parameters varied across the samples, suggesting that the
assumption of a common technology is a poor one. Baumol (1986) coined the term con-
vergence clubs to describe this phenomenon. We divided the sample into three sub-groups:
Central, East andWest (the provinces in each sub-sample are listed in Table 2.1). The Haus-
man test implies that the xed-effect model is more appropriate: the test statistics values
are 19, 0.98 and 14.66 for East, Central and West, respectively, while those of the aug-
mented model are 37.44, 8.08 and 10.30). The regression results are presented in Table
2.4, Table 2.5 and Table 2.6.
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Human capital is still negative and insignicant in Central region and in both regression
models. The other coefcients have not only the predicted sign but also the expected mag-
nitude. After adding foreign direct investment, the Central sub-sample switches from dis-
playing divergence to convergence as shown in the restricted regression of Table 2.7 and
the tendency toward convergence becomes even stronger in the West and East sub-samples.
Moreover, the inclusion of foreign direct investment per capita improves the overall t of
the regressions. Foreign direct investment also appears to be an important determinant
of income per capita: its coefcient estimate is positive and strongly signicant. Again,
focusing on the estimates of the structural parameters, we see that the implied rates of
convergence, ; for the Central, West, and East samples are 0.024, 0.026, and 0.036, re-
spectively. The corresponding estimates of the output elasticity  with respect to capital
are 0.40, 0.61, and 0.61, respectively. In all these cases, convergence was found to be much
stronger within the groups. The restricted regressions (Table 2.7) again conrm these nd-
ings at 5% signicant level. Hence, our analysis indicates that (1) there is slow conditional
convergence among provinces in China as a whole; and (2) there is faster conditional con-
vergence among similar sub-groups of provinces.
2.6 Conclusions
The objective of this chapter was to evaluate empirically the impact of FDI on economic
growth of different provinces of China and, more generally, to examine if economic growth
of China can be explained by the augmented Solow-Swan model. After the liberalization
was initiated in 1978, China has become one of the main destinations for international
capital ows. China has also deed the trend shared by virtually all post-communist coun-
tries in Eastern Europe whose liberalizations were followed by severe output contractions.
Instead, China has experienced very high rates of growth for over a decade. China's expe-
rience is unique since its economy grew rapidly in the context of reforms that transformed
it from a rigid central planning system to an increasingly open and market-based economy.
2.6 Conclusions 44
China's remarkable growth performance over the last three decades is widely attributed to
foreign direct investment. Attracting foreign direct investment has been the main motiva-
tion of Chinese open-door policy (Chow, 2002). A good example of the success of this
policy is the Shenzhen economic zone bordering Hong Kong created in 1982. Foreign in-
vestors could set up factories there to take advantage of the inexpensive and skilled labor
and also of special tax breaks. In less than a decade Shenzhen developed from a piece of
farmland to a modern city. As this example amply demonstrates, FDI inows contributed
not only to overall growth of the Chinese economy but also to increasing economic dis-
parities across China's regions in line with the results of Fleisher et al (2009) which based
on TFP growth model. Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province and Xiamen in Fujian
Province also became special economic zones at that time, and all of them are among the
most developed cities in China now. In contrast, other towns in the Guangdong province
that are approximately as close to Hong Kong as Shenzhen have lagged far behind Shen-
zhen and the other special economic zones.
Our main nding is that the effect of FDI on economic growth in different provinces is posi-
tive and statistically signicant12. More generally, our analysis indicates that the augmented
Solow growth model appears to provide a good description of regional growth patterns in
China over the period 1978-2008. Furthermore, the data display conditional convergence,
after controlling for other determinants of growth, provinces that were initially poor tend to
grow faster. After splitting the data into sub-samples, the evidence in favor of conditional
convergence becomes even stronger, suggesting that regions within China may converge to
different steady states.
The policy implications from our results should not be overlooked. China has experienced
rapid economic growth over the last three decades, which has also resulted in increasing
regional disparities. This was caused by the whims of central planning in the reform pe-
riod and by the strategy of selective localized liberalization in the 1980s. For example, in
12 We did robustness tests by adding more control variables, shown in the appendix and our nding about
the FDI are not affected by the added variables.
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terms of the geographical distribution, the Eastern areas accounted for about 85 percent of
FDI in 1999 (Chow, 2002). Such regional disparities create social and political obstacles to
the continuation of the strategy of selective localized liberalization and undermine the sus-
tainability of such policies. To resolve it, the policy of Western and Central development
should aim to help the laggards and to improve their productivity. The Western and Cen-
tral areas of China should be granted the same privilege that the economic zones have, the
government should invest much more capital in education as it did in Beijing and Shang-
hai. Finding evidence of ongoing convergence it does not imply that regions will achieve
the same level of per capita income in the long run. Even in equilibrium, gaps in regional
per capita income are likely to remain, reecting differences in labor markets, industrial
structure and natural-resource endowments.
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Table 2.1. Sub-groups
Sample Observations
East Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, Shandong,Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan
Central Hebei, Shanxi, Neimenggu, Jilin, Heilongjiang,Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Hubei
West Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunan, Sichuan, Shanxi,Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang
2.7 Tables and Figures 48
Table 2.2. Panel Regression of Five-Year Span Data: Test for Conditional Covergence De-
pendent Variable: Growth of GDP per Working-age Person
Variable Model 1 Model 2
LSDV EGLS LSDV EGLS
(xed effect) (random effects) (xed effects) (random effects)
Constant 0:794674
(0:260622)
0:294383
(0:181991)
2:029187
(0:365588)
1:127410
(0:226508)
ln(Y=L)t 1  0:052676
(0:020734)
 0:011377
(0:014042)
 0:134570
(0:026342)
 0:064760
(0:016190)
ln(n+ g + )  0:186589
(0:024918)
 0:187606
(0:024077)
 0:130860
(0:025937)
 0:148963
(0:023226)
ln(sk) 0:242925

(0:260622)
0:164614
(0:035252)
0:207590
(0:039460)
0:150992
(0:032970)
ln(h) 0:105744
(0:050527)
0:058608
(0:037863)
0:251021
(0:057681)
0:137620
(0:038318)
ln(F ) 0:039816
(0:008885)
0:035743
(0:006499)
Number of
Observations 145 145 142 142
Adjusted R2 0:58 0:44 0:65 0:53
F -statistic 7:12 29:01 8:86 33:13
Hausman Test 2 = 26:18 25:56
Figures in parentheses are standard errors
***1% signifant level, **5% signicant level, *10%signicant level
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Table 2.3. Test for Conditional Convergence by LSDV Estimation, Restricted Regression
Dependent Variable: Growth of GDP per working-age person
Variable Model 1 Model 2
Constant 0:663415
(0:235155)
1:185649
(0:284022)
ln(Y=L)t 1  0:043853
(0:019319)
 0:078616
(0:021836)
ln(sk)  ln(n+ g + ) 0:201387
(0:021440)
0:176682
(0:022211)
ln(h) 0:114929
(0:049979)
0:184575
(0:053338)
ln(F ) 0:013686
(0:004476)
Number of Observations 145 142
Adjusted R2 0:57 0:64
Wald Test of Restriction of P -Value 0:25 0:09
Implied  8:968 7 10 3 1:6376 10 2
Implied  0:821 18 0:692 06
Figures in parentheses are standard errors
***1% signifant level, **5% signicant level, *10%signicant level
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Table 2.4. Test for Conditional Convergence by LSDV Estimation, Unrestricted Regression
Dependent Variable: Growth of GDP per Working-age person, East
Variable Model 1 Model 2
LSDV EGLS LSDV EGLS
(xed effects) (random effects) (xed effects) (random effects)
Constant 1:687464
(0:551068)
1:112659
(0:294175)
3:101302
(0:582805)
1:189495
(0:249347)
ln(Y=L)t 1  0:097487
(0:035511)
 0:068673
(0:018855)
 0:186700
(0:037270)
 0:073938
(0:015997)
ln(n+ g + )  0:161982
(0:038778)
 0:167706
(0:033093)
 0:087929
(0:037490)
 0:158143
(0:028036)
ln(sk) 0:269603

(0:074564)
0:184202
(0:064566)
0:189932
(0:065760)
0:127352
(0:057901)
ln(sh) 0:269123

(0:097115)
0:161056
(0:061280)
0:438576
(0:091975)
0:147291
(0:051853)
ln(F ) 0:057208
(0:014316)
0:028116
(0:009804)
Number of
Observations 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0:54 0:38 0:67 0:43
F - Statistic 5:42 8:46 8:26 8:31
Hausman Test 2 = 19:00 2 = 37:44
Figures in parentheses are standard errors
***1% signifant level, **5% signicant level, *10%signicant level
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Table 2.5. Test for Conditional Convergence by LSDV Estimation, Unrestricted Regression
Dependent Variable: Growth of GDP per Working-age person, Central
Variable Model 1 Model 2
LSDV EGLS LSDV EGLS
(xed effects) (random effects) (xed effects) (random effects)
Constant 0:287947
(0:488434)
0:262356
(0:460740)
2:641572
(0:754331)
0:675044
(0:555138)
ln(Y=L)t 1  0:022539
(0:046697)
 0:0017795
(0:041016)
 0:207436
(0:060181)
 0:044143
(0:043174)
ln(n+ g + )  0:207084
(0:054332)
 0:195360
(0:055275)
 0:134659
(0:056063)
 0:172603
(0:054788)
ln(sk) 0:334793

(0:090091)
0:303385
(0:072866)
0:383026
(0:072764)
0:306302
(0:069808)
ln(h)  0:053815
(0:054332)
 0:047299
(0:099971)
0:176002
(0:110289)
 0:024344
(0:105434)
ln(F ) 0:052399
(0:014405)
0:020879
(0:012913)
Number of
Observations 50 50 48 48
Adjusted R2 0:53 0:49 0:70 0:53
F - Statistic 5:28 12:64 9:00 11:61
Hausman Test 2 = 0:98 2 = 8:08
Figures in parentheses are standard errors
***1% signifant level, **5% signicant level, *10%signicant level
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Table 2.6. Test for Conditional Convergence by LSDV Estimation, Unrestricted Regression
Dependent Variable: Growth of GDP per Working-age person, West
Variable Model 1 Model 2
LSDV EGLS LSDV EGLS
(xed effects) (random effects) (xed effects) (random e ffects)
Constant 1:341237
(0:251705)
0:512157
(0:322876)
1:721576
(0:227778)
1:046867
(0:401439)
ln(Y/L)t 1  0:134987
(0:024447)
 0:064347
(0:032142)
 0:145969
(0:017570)
 0:097368
(0:035748)
ln(n+ g + )  0:188137
(0:034320)
 0:249601
(0:039669)
 0:152802
(0:030547)
 0:224778
(0:041230)
ln(sk) 0:340481

(0:072461)
0:110390
(0:057066)
0:320352
(0:071398)
0:125468
(0:057664)
ln(h) 0:080798
(0:042455)
0:111889
(0:048312)
0:121935
(0:037565)
0:155243
(0:052159)
ln(F ) 0:024328
(0:009559)
0:021584
(0:009186)
Number of
Observations 45 45 44 44
Adjusted R2 0:76 0:54 0:81 0:58
F - Statistic 12:69 13:73 15:23 12:73
Hausman Test 2 = 14:66 2 = 10:30
Figures in parentheses are standard errors
***1% signifant level, **5% signicant level, *10%signicant level
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2.A Appendix
Speed of Convergence () in the Solow Model
Following the modern empirical growth literature, starting with the framework of Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992), Solow model is expressed in terms of capital per effective worker
k, with Cobb-Douglas producction function y = k, saving rate s, depreciation rate , rate
of population growth n, and rate of technological progress g. The fundamental equation of
motion is
_k = sy   (n+ g + )k = sk   (n+ g + )k (2.27)
In the steady state, _k = 0;which implies
k = (
s
n+ g + 
)
1
1  (2.28)
The growth rate of k can be expressed as follows:
gk  sk 1   (n+ g + )  G(k) (2.29)
In the steady state, gk = G(k) = 0
To compute the speed of convergence, take the rst-order of G(k) approximate around the
steady satate k:
G(k)  G(k) +G0(k)(k   k) (2.30)
Substituting the derivative G0(k) of Equation 2.29, it obtains:
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G(k)  (  1)s(k) 1(k   k

k
) (2.31)
Substituting Equation 2.28, yields:
gk   (1  )(n+ g + )(k   k

k
) (2.32)
 is the rate of convergence,  = (1  )(n+ g + ). It measures how quickly k increases
when k < k
Taking the rst-order Talor approximation of lnk around the steady state k
lnk  lnk + 1
k
(k   k) (2.33)
and
(
k   k
k
)  (lnk   lnk) (2.34)
Substituting Equation 2.34 into Equation 2.32
gk   (1  )(n+ g + )(lnk   lnk) (2.35)
y = k, it implies lny = lnk;
gy =
:
y
y
=
dlny
dt
= 
dlnk
dt
= 
_k
k
= gk (2.36)
So,
gy   (1  )(n+ g + )(lny   lny) (2.37)
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 = (1  )(n+ g + ) is the speed of convergence. It measures how quickly y increases
when y < y:
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Table 2.8. Panel Regression of Five-Year Span Data: Test for Conditional Covergence De-
pendent Variable: Growth of GDP per Working-age Person
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
LSDV LSDV LSDV LSDV
(xed effect) (xed effect) (xed effects) (xed effect)
Constant 2:029187
(0:365588)
1:844032
(0:382173)
1:822943
(0:381313)
2:029117
(0:386492)
ln(Y=L)t 1  0:134570
(0:026342)
 0:129789
(0:027474)
 0:128385
(0:027227)
 0:134565
(0:028193)
ln(n+ g + )  0:130860
(0:025937)
 0:117904
(0:025946)
 0:117793
(0:025855)
 0:130862
(0:026211)
ln(sk) 0:207590

(0:039460)
0:240252
(0:260622)
0:240901
(0:040507)
0:207592
(0:039765)
ln(h) 0:251021
(0:057681)
0:291456
(0:050527)
0:251021
(0:057681)
0:251014
(0:059100)
ln(F ) 0:039816
(0:008885)
0:030171
(0:050527)
0:029894
(0:009459)
0:039816
(0:008983)
ln(T )  0:001414
(0:005366)
 3:16E   06
(0:005491)
ln(E)  0:002319
(0:005246)
Ln(G)  0:126780
(0:047427)
 0:127915
(0:047471)
Number of
Observations 142 142 142
Adjusted R2 0:65 0:66 0:66 0:64
F -statistic 8:86 8:95 8:97 8:52
Hausman Test 25:56 2 = 23:82 23:92 24:69
Figures in parentheses are standard errors
***1% signifant level, **5% signicant level, *10%signicant level
T is the "trade openness/ GDP"
E is the "export/ GDP"
G is the "government spending/ GDP"
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Table 2.9. Panel Regression of Five-Year Span Data: Test for Conditional Covergence De-
pendent Variable: Growth of GDP per Working-age Person
Sample East Central West
Provinces Number 10 10 9
variables (xed effects) (xed effects) (xed effects)
Constant 3:048816
(0:617453)
2:582027
(1:187220)
1:715380
(0:232050)
ln(Y=L)t 1  0:182282
(0:040700)
 0:134570
(0:026342)
 0:064760
(0:016190)
ln(n+ g + )  0:090222
(0:038797)
 0:154722
(0:059735)
 0:151766
(0:031381)
ln(sk) 0:191698

(0:066912)
0:302195
(0:090230)
0:324076
(0:074092)
ln(h) 0:436039
(0:093608)
0:224298
(0:166523)
0:120721
(0:038476)
ln(F ) 0:056252
(0:014873)
0:040955
(0:021961)
0:024703
(0:009870)
ln(T )  0:002282
(0:007834)
0:052566
(0:073486)
 0:001848
(0:006479)
Number of
Observations 50 48 44
Adjusted R2 0:67 0:53 0:80
F -statistic 7:52 4:57 13:66
Figures in parentheses are standard errors
***1% signifant level, **5% signicant level, *10%signicant level
T is the "trade openness/ GDP"
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Table 2.11. FDI inows by source country (in 10000 US dollars)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Hong Kong 1786093
(33:86%)
1770010
(33:08%)
1899830
(31:33%)
1794879
(29:75%)
2023292
(32:11%)
2770342
(37:05%)
4103640
(44:41%)
Virgin Islands 611739
(11:60%)
577696
(10:80%)
673030
(11:10%)
902167
(14:96%)
1124758
(17:85%)
1655244
(22:14%)
1595384
(17:27%)
Japan 419009
(7:94%)
505419
(9:45%)
545157
(8:99%)
652977
(10:82%)
459806
(7:30%)
358922
(4:80%)
365235
(3:95%)
Korea 272073
(5:16%)
448854
(8:39%)
624786
(10:30%)
516834
(8:57%)
389487
(6:18%)
367831
(4:92%)
313532
(3:39%)
US 542392
(10:28%)
419851
(7:85%)
394095
(6:50%)
306123
(5:07%)
286509
(4:55%)
261623
(3:50%)
294434
(3:19%)
UK 89576
(1:70%)
74247
(1:39%)
79282
(1:31%)
96475
(1:60%)
72610
(1:15%)
83094
(1:11%)
91401
(0:99%)
Germany 92796
(1:76%)
85697
(1:60%)
105848
(1:75%)
153004
(2:54%)
197871
(3:14%)
73397
(0:98%)
90049
(0:97%)
France 57560
(1:09%)
60431
(1:13%)
65674
(1:08%)
61506
(1:02%)
38269
(0:61%)
45601
(0:61%)
58775
(0:64%)
Taiwan 397064
(7:53%)
337724
(6:31%)
311749
(5:14%)
215171
(3:57%)
213583
(3:39%)
177437
(2:37%)
189868
(2:05%)
Singapore 233720
(4:43%)
205840
(3:85%)
200814
(3:31%)
220432
(3:65%)
226046
(3:59%)
318457
(4:26%)
443529
(4:80%)
Macao 46838
(0:89%)
41660
(0:78%)
54639
(0:90%)
60046
(1:00%)
60290
(0:96%)
63700
(0:85%)
58161
(0:63%)
Others 725426
(13:75%)
823038
(15:38%)
1108094
(18:28%)
1052845
(17:45%)
1209532
(19:19%)
1301141
(17:40%)
1635536
(17:70%)
Total FDI inow 5274286
(100%)
5350467
(100%)
6062998
(100%)
6032459
(100%)
6302053
(100%)
7476789
(100%)
9239544
(100%)
Figures in parentheses are in percentage of Total FDI inows
Sources: National Bureau of Statistic of China
This Table is based on data for utilized (not contracted) FDI
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Table 2.12. Total Capital inow and FDI inow (in 10000 US dollars)
FDI inow Total Capital inow the share of FDI in Total Capital inow
1984 125800:00 412800:00 30:47%
1985 166100:00 953100:00 17:43%
1986 187400:00 1139300:00 16:45%
1987 231400:00 974000:00 23:76%
1988 319400:00 1111400:00 28:74%
1989 339200:00 1213300:00 27:96%
1990 348700:00 1161100:00 30:03%
1991 436600:00 1285900:00 33:95%
1992 1100700:00 2764200:00 39:82%
1993 2751500:00 5035300:00 54:64%
1994 3376700:00 6078900:00 55:55%
1995 3752100:00 6606700:00 56:79%
1996 4172500:00 6972100:00 59:85%
1997 4525700:00 11117998:00 40:71%
1998 4546300:00 8932679:00 50:90%
1999 4041200:00 9175393:90 44:04%
2000 4077200:00 9198639:20 44:32%
2001 4684600:00 9953113:50 47:07%
2002 5274300:00 12832130:60 41:10%
2003 5350500:00 21963061:20 24:36%
2004 6063000:00 34335015:10 17:66%
2005 8550641:00 41895620:00 20:41%
2006 8656741:00 65327625:00 13:25%
2007 14962371:00 92196070:00 16:23%
2008 16087818:00 76987609:00 20:90%
Sources: National Bureau of Statistic of China and "Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials 50 Years of New China"
1984-2004 is based on data for utilized FDI, 2005-2008 is based on data for contracted FDI
Chapter 3
Unemployment, Growth and Transition in
China
3.1 Introduction
China has been experiencing rapid economic growth since it initiated economic reform in
1978, changing gradually from a planned to a market economy. However, unemployment
has increased signicantly during the last two decades, and has become one of the most
pressing problems of the Chinese economy today. Intuitively, we should expect the high
output growth rate to reduce unemployment. This would be in line with Okun's Law, one
of the basic rules of macroeconomics, which postulates an inverse relationship between
output growth and changes in unemployment (Okun, 1962). Arthur Okun, using U.S. data,
concluded that in the post-war period, on the average, each extra percentage point in
the unemployment rate above four percent has been associated with about a three percent
decrement in real GNP. Previous studies have largely conrmed the existence of the trade-
off between unemployment and output in mature market economies (Izyumov and Vahaly,
2002). This chapter asks the question whether the direction of the link between output and
unemployment changes in China is the same as that found in mature market economies.
The main consideration is how unemployment will affect China's economic growth and
economic reform progress overall.
The process of economic transition has had a major impact on the urban labor market in
China. China, like other former communist countries, started its transition from a situation
of permanent full employment. Before the reform, the employment system consisted of
three key components: First, when an urban worker was assigned to a post, he/she would
enjoy a life-long employment without fear of dismissal and unemployment. Second, the
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hukou system of household registration restricted the ability of residents to move between
rural and urban areas and across regions. Third, there was a host of welfare policies includ-
ing rationing of basic necessities, urban exclusive social security policy and other public
service provision policies which effectively prevented labor mobility and equal treatment
of residents in rural and urban areas (Cai and Wang, 2010). After the reform of urban em-
ployment system was accomplished and the iron rice bowl13 was broken, labor allocation
became mostly market-based. Privatization of state owned enterprises and unemployment
in urban areas emerged during the period of economic transition and structural adjustment
in the late 1990s (Cai and Wang, 2010). Around ten million workers were laid off from
state owned enterprises and urban collectives in 1996, and again in 1997 (Qian, 1999)
There are only a few previous studies on this issue of China and those restricted their
attention to the relationship between growth and unemployment at the aggregate level and
they ignore the regional aspects of this relationship (see Wu, 2003, Cai and Wang, 2010).
However, the progress of reform has been uneven and the benets of economic reform
differ across regions. As a result, there are large differences in the degree of economic
development between the three broad regions of China: EAST, CENTRAL and WEST.
During this transition, the coastal areas in the East have particularly beneted from the
open-door policy, developing much more quickly than the interior areas in the Central and
Western regions. Therefore, an examination of the growth-unemployment relationship at
the regional level is as important and interesting as the aggregate level analysis.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 tests the Okun's type relation in China at
both national level and regional level, focusing on two sub-periods. We anticipate Okun's
Law to be stronger in the Eastern region than in the interior regions. Section 3 focuses
on the interaction between the unemployment and growth both at national level and re-
gional level. We expect the relationship between unemployment and growth to be weak
or non-existent during the early stage of market transition. Rather, the relationship should
13 It is a Chinese term used to refer to an occupation with guaranteed job security, as well as steady income
and benets.
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emerge only as market reforms progress. In section 4, we discuss the linkage between un-
employment rate and the speed of transition as postulated by the Aghion- Blanchard model.
Section 5, conclusions and policy implication.
3.2 Background of China's labor market
Before the initiation of reform in 1978, China's urban labor market was characterized by a
system of centrally xed wages and lifetime secured employment. Under central planning,
particularly in SOEs, the State Ministry of Labor operated a centrally controlled employ-
ment plan with individual rms being allocated an annual employment quota. In addition,
rms were not allowed to dismiss workers and employee's mobility were also strictly lim-
ited (White, 1988). Wages were set according to a wage grid, originally taken over from
the Soviet model. It classied workers into eight levels based on an individual's personal
endowments and work experience but in practice it was determined more by seniority or
age (Coady and Wang, 2000).
In order to provide improved incentives for greater enterprise and individual productivity,
labor market reforms were introduced in the mid-1980s (Coady and Wang, 2000). The ma-
jor labor market reforms in the urban sector included the introduction of bonus wages and
labor contract system. The new wage system separated total wages into two components:
standard (including basic wage, position wage, tenure wage and work-related allowances)
and bonus wages. Since labor contract was introduced from 1986 up until 1996, the new
entrants into the labor force became to rely more on the market mechanism for alloca-
tions, but the employment mechanism of the labor stock was not marketized (Lu and Jiang,
2008).
Prior to the early 1990s, reforms were aimed at improving managerial and worker incen-
tives of state enterprises, thus encouraging the entry of non-state rms as well as fostering
competition. After 1996, the employment system of the labor stock was quickly marke-
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tized. Privatization of state owned enterprises was initiated and unemployment in urban14
areas emerged during the period of economic transition and structural adjustment in the late
1990s (Cai and Wang, 2010). Cai and Wang (2010) state that it was only after the reform
of urban employment system was accomplished and the iron rice bowel was broken, by
and large, that labor allocation became mostly maket-based. They also point out that dur-
ing that period not only a lay-off subsidy program was implemented by the government, an
unemployment insurance system, a basic pension regime, and a minimum living standard
program were built up to protect urban workers but also set a liberalized labor market reg-
ulations to encourage labor mobility. As a result, the employment structure has diversied.
Dong and Xu (2009) show that China has successfully moved toward a functioning labor
market by examining the patterns and determinants of the labor restructuring process in
China using two large rm-level datasets for the period between1998-2002. In the process
of labor market reform, the market mechanism has taken an increasingly important role
in the determination of a person's income. However, Lu and Jiang (2008) mention that
given the institutional background of the labor market, in SOEs, employees' negotiating
power was very weak because of the weakness of trade unions as in reality, trade unions
are subordinate organizations established within enterprises by the Party and governments.
Furthermore, although the household registration system became much more exible, there
still exists serious segmentation in China's labor market as local governments aim to protect
local urban residents.
3.3 Does Okun's type relationship exist in China?
14 In rural areas, the household responsibility system gurantees that everybody has his or her share of land,
so it is a reasonable assumption that rural unemployment is negligible since laborers either work in non-
argricultural sectors or in argriculture.
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3.3.1 Literature review
Okun's law is a macroeconomic relation between output growth and unemployment change.
Okun's law states that, on average, each extra percentage point in the unemployment rate
above four percent has been associated with about a three percent decrease in real GNP
over the post-war period (Okun, 1962; pp.99). It is one of the basic rules of macroeco-
nomics. The aggregate supply curve is derived by combining Okun's relation with the
Philips curve (Moosa, 1997). In addition, it is used as a benchmark for measuring the cost
of unemployment (Moosa, 1997).
The negative sign of the Okun's coefcient has been conrmed in the literature, although
its magnitude coefcient is sensitive to the model specication, choice of control variables,
econometric methods and sample periods. Smith (1975), Gordon (1984), Weber (1995)
and Prachowny (1993) re-estimate the Okun's relationship based on US data and the co-
efcient varies with the different methodology used, such as ordinary least square, au-
toregressive transformation instrumental variable procedure, cyclical data series, and other
factors added in. Kaufman (1988), Lee (2000), and Moosa (1999) evaluate the Okun rela-
tionship in order to check the robustness based on a cross-country (6 industrial countries, 16
OECD countries, and G7 countries, respectively). They nd signicant differences among
them. In addition, Lee (2000) points out that the results are sensitive to the choice of rst-
difference model or the gap model. Courtney (1991, see Harris and Silverstone, 1993)
rst presents the idea of asymmetry that Okun's coefcient may be different in expansions
and contractions. Harris and Silverstone (2001) test the Okun's coefcient in an asymmet-
ric model for seven OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand,
the United Kingdom and the United States). They nd that some results only can be ob-
tained with the asymmetric model rather than standard estimation of Okun's law. Silvapulle
et al (2004) show that their results support Okun's law being asymmetric based on US data
over the post-war period.
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Furthermore, Izyumov and Vahaly (2002) detect Okun's relationship in 25 transition coun-
tries. They divided the sample into two groups, leaders and laggards and show that transi-
tion countries establish a normal Okun's relationship as the market transition progressed.
Although the empirical study of Okun's law has indeed blossomed, especially, in studying
developed countries, little attention has been paid to study whether Okun's type relationship
exists in China. Nevertheless, a lot of Chinese economists and politicians studied Okun's
type relation in China by using different methods and different time spans. Wu (2003)
nd Okun's law to be non-linear in China over the period 1988-1998. However, most of
them found that Okun's Law does not work in China. This is explained by reasons such as
structural unemployment, frictional unemployment and so on.
3.3.2 Model and Data
In Okun's original article (Okun, 1962), there are two standard model specications: the
rst-difference model and the gap model. The rst-difference model uses the real
GDP (GNP) growth and the rst difference of unemployment, as given by the following
expression:
U = a  b(Y=Y ) (3.38)
From the point of view of the gap model, the difference between the observed and nat-
ural rate of unemployment represents the cyclical rate of unemployment and the difference
between the observed and potential GDP captures the cyclical level of output. The speci-
cation is given by the expression.
U = a+ b(gap) (3.39)
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For China, like other transition countries, there are no reliable estimates of potential GDP,
NAIRU, or similar macroeconomic benchmarks (Izyumov and Vahaly, 2002). So, only the
rst-difference model seems feasible for our study. We follow Izyumov and Vahaly (2002)
and use the equation.
yi;t   yi;t 1 = + (ui;t   ui;t 1) + "i;t
i = 1; 2; 3; :::m; provinces
t = 1; 2; 3; :::n; years
(3.40)
Where yi;t is represents the log of observed real output (GDP) of province i, ui;t is the
observed unemployment rate of province i,  is the intercept estimating the average real
GDP growth rate;  is the Okun coefcient; and "i;t is the usual disturbance term. The
Okun's law suggests that the growth rate of output is negatively related to the changes of
unemployment rate ( < 0).
Output is measured by the real provincial GDP. Unemployment is the provincial registered
urban unemployment rate. Annual data were obtained from the Chinese National Statistical
Bureau and China labour statistical yearbook. Chongqing and Tibet are excluded due to
lack of data. The period is 1997-2006 as market mechanism become more prominent in the
determination of employment and output and could be expected to operate more normally
during the period (Izyumov, and Vahaly, 2002).
Unemployment measurement in China is also inadequate, as some other former communist
countries. Rural residents tend to be under employed rather than unemployed because they
often work at least some hours on the family farm (Giles et al., 2005). Furthermore, nei-
ther hidden unemployed people nor laid-off workers (xia gang) are counted as unemployed
(Jackman, 1998; Clarke and Borisov, 1999). There are some plausible explanations: Gu
(1999) explains that this is because they are still maintaining employment relations with
their enterprise by living in company-owned houses and/or having National Insurance paid
by their enterprises and therefore are not required to register as unemployed. Giles et al.
(2005) think that substantial numbers of ofcially laid off (xia gang) workers may actually
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be working part- or full-time or may no longer be looking for work. There are a number of
alternative estimates calculated based on published government data on employment, reg-
istered unemployment, and ofcially laid off (xia gang15) workers. However, Giles et al.
(2005) point out that estimates based on administrative data are subject to potentially se-
rious shortcomings and none of them are calculated in a way that is consistent with the
standard international practice. They present true unemployment rates calculated based
on data from the 2002 follow-up survey to the China Urban Labor Survey which follows in-
ternational practice in dening unemployment. Interestingly and surprisely, the correlation
between the ofcial urban registered unemployment rates and their true unemployment
rate, which includes laid off, is very high (0.98). Therefore, the difference in the denition
of the unemployment rate should not substantially affect the direction of the ndings of
this study. So, in this chapter we use the ofcial urban registered unemployment as a proxy
instead of the true unemployment rates, as the latter is only available limited years.
3.3.3 Empirical Results
The question we consider in our empirical analysis is whether Okun's type relationship
exists at the national and the regional level. All reported results in this section are based on
the Okun's rst difference model (Equation (3.38)) with LSDV (Least Square Dummy
Variables). The regional analysis is carried out in panel framework.
The Okun's type relationship is tested based on the whole data by Equation (3.40). Ta-
ble 3.13 reports the results. The Okun's coefcient is insignicant and negative for the full
period, 1997-2006. When we consider sub-periods, the coefcient is positive but insigni-
cant for the early period (1997-2001). However, we nd support for Okun's law during the
later period, 2002-2006.
15 For "laid off", China uses the term, "xia gang", it implies that those not working are still retained by their
original units with partial pay.
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Besides the analysis for sub periods, we further split the sample into three regional sub-
groups (EAST, CENTRAL and WEST) shown in Table 3.14. The results for EAST, CEN-
TRAL and WEST are reported in Table 3.15. Those for EAST and CENTRAL are quite
similar: they both have signicant and negative coefcients which are consistent with the
pattern observed for developed countries. When considering sub-periods, the coefcients
are again insignicant and negative for early sample period 1997-2001. For the later pe-
riod, 2002-2006, the coefcients are signicant and negative which implies Okun's type
relationship present. However, the WEST appears quite different from EAST and CEN-
TRAL. During the period 1997-2006, the estimated coefcient is highly signicant and
positive. The results for sub periods are insignicant.
3.3.4 Summary
This section has examined the Okun's type of relationship in China, both for the country as
a whole and for broad regional groups that reect the different progress that different parts
of China have made towards liberalizing and opening the economy. When considering the
full period, we nd that Okun's Law does not hold for the whole sample, but it is found to
be valid in the EAST and CENTRAL sub-samples. These results are in line with the results
of Izyumov and Vahaly (2002) who examine the post-communist transition countries and
nd that Okun's Law only holds in those countries that have made enough progress in
market-oriented reform. The pattern observed in the WEST sub-sample, however, goes
against Okun's law: during the full period, 1997-2006, the relationship between the GDP
growth rate and changes of unemployment rate is in fact positive and highly signicant
while it is not signicant in either of the sub-periods. These differences in the nature of
the relationship between growth and unemployment may be driven by the uneven progress
in implementing economic reform in China. The coastal areas of the EAST region were
exposed to reform measures and the market economy much earlier than the interior areas
of CENTRAL and especially WEST. This would explain also why Okun's relation can be
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detected in the later sub-period for EAST and CENTRAL but not during the earlier one
and in neither sub-period for WEST. We address this issue in the following two sections.
3.4 The relationship between growth rate and unemployment
rate
3.4.1 Theoretical results and empirical evidence
The bulk of the existing theoretical literature has focussed on the effects of growth on
unemployment. A signicant innovation occurred with Pissarides (1990) who derives a
theoretical model that is the rst to introduce the link between long run growth and un-
employment, and argues that a higher rate of productivity growth reduces unemployment
through a positive capitalization effect of investment on job creation. Building up on
Pissarides (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1994) develop a model that combines capitaliza-
tion and creative destruction. The capitalisation effect reects the fact that an increase
in growth raises the capitalised returns by decreasing the discount rate which increases the
present benet of entry and hence increases the number of job openings. This, in turn,
reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment. This stands in contrast to the creative de-
struction effect, according to which an increase in growth may reduce the life time of
production units16 and thus raises the equilibrium level of unemployment by raising the
job separation rate. In order to take advantage of innovation, the old machines need to be
shut down by the rm. When this happens, workers become unemployed until matched
with a new machine. Aghion and Howitt show that the `creative destruction' effect dom-
inates at low growth rates while the `capitalisation' effect dominates at high ones, leading
to a hump shaped relationship between unemployment and growth. The sign of the rela-
tionship between growth and unemployment therefore can be either positive or negative.
16 Aghion and Howitt (1994) explain that each production unit consists of (1) a machine embodying a
technology of some vintage t, (2) a worker, appropriately matched with the machine, (3) a (variable) amount
of human capital.
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Hoon and Phelps (1997) show that no relationship exists in the long run between the rate
of growth and unemployment in their model. Acemoglu (1997) proposes a simple exten-
sion of the standard search model of Diamond, Mortensen and Pissarides (see Pissarides,
1990) and discusses the link between skills and technological change and the interaction of
unemployment and technology. He also explains that technological progress is likely to be
slower in labor markets where job tenure is low. Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) develop
a model that analyzes both the capitalization and creative destruction effects. They sug-
gest that it is not easy to nd clear-cut associations between growth and unemployment in
aggregate data since technological progress can lead to job destruction but can also create
new jobs because of innovation.
There is similarly no concensus in the previous empirical literature regarding the sign of
the correlation between growth and unemployment either across countries or across longer
periods of time within the same country. A number of authors, such as Saint-Paul (1993),
argue that there is a positive relationship between unemployment and productivity growth.
Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) suggest the possibility of a positive long-run relationship
between growth and unemployment, since they show that periods of high unemployment
tend to be periods of high job-turnover at the establishment level. Caballero (1993), in a
time-series framework with quarterly data, nds evidence of a weak positive relationship
between growth and unemployment in the UK and US between 1966 and 1989. Hoon and
Phelps (1997) conrm their theory-based hypothesis in their analysis of G7 countries: they
nd that increases in the unemployment rate tend to slow down productivity growth. Mus-
catelli and Tirelli (2001) nd negative correlation for ve G7 economies (Japan, Germany,
Italy, France, Canada). Bean and Pissarides (1993) show that bivariate correlation between
unemployment and growth can be either positive or negative depending on the differences
in economic structures across OECD economies.
The above literature focuses on the effect of growth on unemployment. However, there
are also likely to be forces running in the other direction, which is also of interest. High
unemployment may have an adverse effect on growth in the presence of a learning-by-
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doing, reduction of the pool of saving available for investment in physical or human capital
or knowledge-creating activities (Bean and Pissarides, 1993).
3.4.2 Empirical methodology and data
In order to examine the interaction between the growth rate and unemployment rate, we
adopt panel data approach with xed effects. We investigate the impact of growth on un-
employment and unemployment on growth, respectively.
This section uses the same data sets as section 2.2.2: unemployment rate is the registered
urban unemployment rate, growth rate calculated as the annual difference in the log of
the annual provincial real GDP with data ranging from 1997 to 2006. The whole data set
includes 29 provinces based on availability of data and descriptive statistics are provided
in Table 3.16. In this section, sub samples and are also applied (see Table 3.14).
3.4.3 Empirical results
The question which we consider in this section is twofold. First, it is interesting to see
how growth affects the labor market (and unemployment in particular). Second, how the
performance of labor market (unemployment) affects growth. This section carries out the
analysis at national (whole sample) and regional level. We tried both linear and non-linear
regressions. The R-squared of results based on the non-linear model is larger than that of
the linear model. So, non-linear LSDV (Least Square Dummy Variables) specication is
adopted.
Table 3.17 shows how growth affects unemployment. It is very clear that there is a hump
shaped relationship between unemployment and growth based on Full sample, EAST,
CENTRAL and WEST data set. The empirical results conrm the prediction of Aghion
and Howitt (1994): the sign of the effect of growth on unemployment can be either positive
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or negative depending on the magnitude of growth. High rates of growth are negatively
correlated with unemployment, while low rates of growth are positively correlated with
unemployment. The calculated turning points (peak points) for the Full sample, EAST,
CENTRAL, and WEST data sets are 0.22, 0.13, 0.19 and 0.15, respectively.
Table 3.18 presents the effect of unemployment on growth. There is again a hump-shaped
relationship between unemployment and growth based on full sample, WEST and EAST
(1997-2001). However, it is not signicant for CENTRAL neither for the period 1997-
2006 nor 1997-2001. The calculated turning points (peak points) for the FULL, EAST and
WEST data sets as 5.28%, 2.53% and 4.9%, respectively.
3.4.4 Summary
This section has investigated the link between the unemployment and growth. The main
nding is that there is a hump-shaped relationship between unemployment and growth,
which may go either from growth to unemployment or from unemployment to growth. The
former is consistent with Aghion and Howitt's (1994) theory that stipulates two different
kinds of effects of growth on unemployment. Figure 3.1 indicates that growth should affect
unemployment positively as in the whole sample and in the three sub-samples, EAST,
CENTRAL and WEST, most of the actual observations of growth are below their turning
points. So, based on Aghion and Howitt's (1994) theory, the creative destruction effect
should dominate in China.
Concerning the relationship going from unemployment to growth, Figure 3.2 shows that
in EAST, unemployment has a negative effect on growth as most observation of unem-
ployment are greater than the turning point 2.53%. So, increasing unemployment inhibits
economic growth in this region. In WEST, unemployment has positive relationship with
growth as the majority of observations in this area are lower than the turning point 4.9%.
The relationship obtained for CENTRAL is, as stated above, insignicant.
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This pattern, positive relationship between unemployment and growth in WEST, absence
of any relationship in CENTRAL and negative relationship in EAST may appear peculiar
at rst. In essence, it implies that, given its low unemployment level, increasing unemploy-
ment should improve WEST economic growth. Why China and especially the West region
should display a positive relationship between growth rate of output and unemployment
rate? We believe this pattern is related to the fact that China continues to be a transition
economy and, crucially, that the progress in implemented economic reform has differed
substantially across the three broad regions. By the end of 1996, some 70 percent of small
state owned enterprises17 have been transformed and privatized. The reform has had a far-
reaching impact on the Chinese economy and has come at a considerable cost in terms of
employment losses.
Does unemployment affect the speed of transition in China? The Aghion-Blanchard model
(1994) is particularly instructive with respect to this question. The purpose of next section
therefore is to show how this theoretical model can shed light on this questions.
3.5 The trade off between the speed of transition and
unemployment rate
3.5.1 Overview
China has been experiencing rapid economic growth on the background of increasing un-
employment in the last decade. Total unemployment increased signicantly during the last
two decades, becoming today one of the most pressing problems of the Chinese economy18.
17 China's public sector is dominanted by small and medium sized enterprises which accounted for 95 per-
cent of the number of entities, 57 percent of employment and 43 percent of output of the state industrial sector
(Qian, 1999).
18 Urban regitered unemployment rate increased to 4.3% in 2009 which reported by National Bureau of Sta-
tistics of China. This is the highest rate since 2002. The ofcial reported unemployment rates are undoubtedly
low. For example, ofcial reported registered unemployment rate is 4% in 2008. The "true" unemployment
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Meanwhile, China is facing the challenge of transforming its planned and less efcient la-
bor allocation system into a well-functioning and more efcient labor market (Appleton et
al, 2005). Unemployment is a political concern in all economies during the transition to a
market economy since any government will want the level of unemployment to remain low
because of the ultimate threat to its own survival (Katz and Owen, 1993). So, it is sensi-
ble to focus the attention on the relationship between the optimal speed of transition and
unemployment rate.
There are few empirical studies on the speed of transition and unemployment rate in tran-
sition countries. Valev (2004) mentions that a reasonable number of Bulgarians think that
high unemployment is necessary to maintain the economic reform to get succeed. Further-
more, he states that high unemployment is a necessary part of economic reforms and it
can reduce the opposition to the reforms. However, Blanchard (1997) points out that the
reform may be reversed if economic gains do not accrue soon enough. Aghion and Blan-
chard (1994) present a theoretical model which illustrates that the maximum speed of labor
allocation depends on the optimal rate of unemployment during transition. Tichit (2006)
develops a theoretical model based on the Aghion- Blanchard model which introduces job-
to-job search and layoffs in the private sector, and argues: (1) job destruction is present in
the new private sector even if this one is the key job creator and (2) most of the job reallo-
cation from state to private employment is direct. However, the Aghion-Blanchard model
assumes state workers must rst be laid off before nding a job in the new sector.
Transition, simply described, is the process whereby state-owned enterprises are handed
over to private agents (Behrens and Wunner, 1996). During the process of transformation,
there will be a number of unemployed people who are laid off from state owned rms and
who will be absorbed by the creation vacancies of new private rms.
rate calculated with including laid off (xia gang) is 9.4% in 2008 by the institute of Economics of the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences. It implies it is a pressing problem of the Chinese economy.
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Considering China's situation, the majority of labour ows from the state-owned sector to
private sector is consistent with the assumptions of the Aghion-Blanchard model. First,
in China, state-sectors workers are usually laid off rst and seek private-sector jobs while
being unemployed rather than moving to the private sector directly; this is because state-
sector workers enjoy social benets and greater job security compared with the private
sector. Second, Huang et al (2010) nd out that productive efciency in the state sector is
lower than in other sectors. Therefore, our empirical analysis is based on Aghion Blanchard
model.
3.5.2 The Aghion Blanchard Model
Before proceeding with the empirical analysis, we rst briey describe the Aghion-Blanchard
model. Aghion and Blanchard (1994) present a dynamic optimization model of the opti-
mal speed of transition and optimal unemployment rate (see also the description in Roland,
2000).
Aghion and Blanchard (1994) derive the following relationship for the speed of job creation
in the new private sector with unemployment level (for detailed derivation see Roland,
2000, P 113).
Np _(t) =
aU(t)
U(t) + ca

1  c  b
1  U(t)

(3.41)
Np(t) denotes the number of workers in the private sector at date t whose marginal pro-
ductivity is yp. Ns(t) is the number of workers in the state sector at date t whose marginal
productivity is ys. U(t) is the number of unemployed people at time t. Population is
normalized to one, thus Np(t) +Ns(t) + Ut = 1. The equation above is obtained by max-
imizing the net present value of output:
R1
0
[Np(t)yp +Ns(t)ys] e
 tdt , based on private
sector marginal productivity (yp) being higher than that in the state sector (ys). Np _(t), hir-
ing in the private sector is decided by market forces. Ns _(t), lay-offs in the state sector, are
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determined by the government. At the beginning of the economic transition, everybody is
employed in the state sector. During the transition, employment in the state sector drops
from 1 to less than 1. a, b, c and  are constants and stand for scale parameter, per cap-
ital level unemployment benets, the difference between the value of being in the private
sector and the value of being unemployed, and interest (discount) rate, respectively.
Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between U(t) and Np(t): an inverted U-curve. Clearly,
there is an optimal level of unemployment U that maximizes Np _(t), the speed of expan-
sion of the private sector. In addition, if there is no unemployment, the private sector cannot
develop, and when unemployment reaches level 1   b=(1   c), the private sector cannot
develop either. Hence as Aghion and Blanchard (1994) point out, at low unemployment,
higher unemployment leads to more job creation in private sector whereas at high unem-
ployment, higher unemployment leads to less job creation. Because they assume that taxes
are levied equally on both state and private employment to nance unemployment bene-
ts, when unemployment gets sufciently large, the effect on taxes dominates the effect on
wages19 and private job creation decline. The model implicates that optimal unemployment
leads to better development of the private sector and maximizes the net present value of the
sum of output.
3.5.3 Empirical Results
To the best of our knowledge, empirical tests based on Aghion-Blanchard model have not
been conducted yet. We make use of panel data approach with xed effects. Aghion and
Blanchard (1994) depict the relationship between the speed of reform and the unemploy-
ment as hump shaped, so a quadratic formula y = c + ax2 + bx + e is applied to examine
if the model works in China.
19 Aghion and Blanchard (1994) assume that high unemployment leads to low wage and low unemployment
leads to high wage which is derived from supply and demand curve.
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The data on unemployment are the same as the above. The speed of transition is measured
as increases in the number of private employees which include the number of workers
in rms that are private, individually owned, joint-venture owned, share holding, foreign
fund, investment by Hong Kong/ Taiwan/ Macao, share cooperative or limited liability
company20.
Empirical test results based on the full sample are reported in Table 3.19. The results
strongly support the model of Aghion and Blanchard (1994) at the 1 percent signicance
level: there is an inverted U-curve relationship between the speed of transition and un-
employment rate in China. It is consistent with their theory, according to which at low
unemployment level, higher unemployment leads to faster the speed of transition; at high
unemployment level, higher unemployment leads to lower the speed of transition. The op-
timal speed of transition corresponds to the unemployment rate of 3.53%. We do not split
data into sub-regions as the taxes are set by national level not provincial level. For exam-
ple, province A has higher unemployment rate than province B but they will also have the
same taxes rate.
3.5.4 Summary
In this section, the link between the speed of transition and unemployment in China has
been investigated. The main nding is that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship which
is consistent with the theory of Aghion and Blanchard (1994). We also can learn some im-
plication from this theory and it can help us to better understand and balance the challenges
of increasing unemployment with the reallocation of economic activities, reforms of the
labor market and restructuring of existing rms.
20 In any privatization plan there are three groups of rms. The rst group consists of the rms that have
been converted to private ownership, and the second group is newly created private rms by domestic entre-
preneurs and foreign investors, and the third group is those restructured by investment or introduced advanced
management (Katz and Owen, 1993). Aghion and Blanchard (1994) state that in their paper, no difference
between privatization and restructure. However, restructuring requires outside nance, requires privatization.
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Aghion and Blanchard (1994) theory tells us that there is an optimal rate of unemployment
which maximizes the total output over the specic period. The optimal level of unemploy-
ment rate is 3.53%, which it will yield the optimal speed of transition, at least based on data
covering the period 1997-2006 (see Table 3.19). In fact, China's average unemployment
rate was 3.54%21 over this period. We can draw the conclusion that the current unem-
ployment rate is necessary and unavoidable: it should help facilitate China's transition and
economic reform. Short-term hardship thus will be outweighed by long-term economic
gain, as suggested by Valev (2004 ).
3.6 Conclusions
Based on the above analysis and investigation, we can give some plausible answers to
the questions raised at rst. Why Okun's law does not hold in China? Will transition
be achieved with increasing unemployment? How to improve regional development and
reduce regional disparities?
Okun's law does not hold in China universally. In particular, we found positive relationship
between the growth rate and changes of unemployment rate during the period 1997-2006
in the WEST sub-sample. In contrast, the CENTRAL and EAST sub-samples both dis-
play negative relationship between the growth rate and the changes of unemployment rate
which is consistent with Okun's relationship. Furthermore, we can nd that this relation-
ship has changed during the transition progress. Specically, based on two sub periods, the
underlying relationship changed from signicant positive to insignicant negative based in
WEST, from insignicant negative to signicant negative in CENTRAL and from insignif-
icant negative to signicant negative in EAST. This is because China is different from de-
veloped countries. China is experiencing transition from a planned labor allocation system
21 This appears very low, compared to developed economies as well as other transition economies as here
we only use the registered unemployment rate to proxy the actual true unemployment rate. The latter corre-
sponding to this optimal rate is likely to be higher.
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into a market-drive labor market. At the beginning of opening up reform, the government
let EAST (coastal provinces) pursue reform one step ahead of the other regions in the
country. EAST obtained most of priority to introduce foreign funds and advanced technol-
ogy which lead to the degree of economic development that is much higher than those in
WEST and CENTRAL. CENTRAL in turn is more developed than WEST.
So far, government does not need worry about unemployment too much at the aggregate
level. The empirical test based on Aghion and Blanchard (1994) theory implicates that this
unemployment level is necessary to achieve the optimal speed of transition and it leads to
maximize the total output. It is a price that China must pay for the future prosperity. How-
ever, China is a quite big country with more than 1.3 billion populations and disparities in
economic development are high. Government should pay more attention to regional devel-
opment and reduce regional disparities. The conjecture depend on this empirical analysis
and China's current state. It implies that excess state rms closures in EAST may slow
down job creation in the private sector since given that the states rms bore the task of
maintaining employment and promote social stability (Huang et al., 2010). However, close
some inefcient state rms in WEST which is necessary for the development of private
sector to promote transition progress. Meanwhile, government should invest more in the
some interior regions to help them attract more investments and job creation based on better
infrastructure and transportation.
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Table 3.13. Estimates of Okun's Coefcient by LSDV Panel approach, Whole sample (29
provinces)
Period Okun's coefcient t-Statistics
1997  2006  0:000924
(0:001780)
 0:519247
1997  2001 0:000212
(0:000578)
0:367136
2002  2006  0:015068
(0:002877)
  5:237059
Figures in parenthese are standard errors. ***1% signicant level
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Table 3.14. Sub-groups
Sample Observations
East Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, Shandong,Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan
Central Hebei, Shanxi, Neimenggu, Jilin, Heilongjiang,Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Hubei
West Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunan, Sichuan, Shanxi,Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang
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Table 3.15. Estimates of Okun's Coefcient by LSDV Panel approach
Period Okun's coefcient t-Statistics
Panel A. EAST sample (10 provinces)
1997  2006  0:013416
(0:003695)
  3:630902
1997  2001  0:001656
(0:003376)
 0:490475
2002  2006  0:009531
(0:002803)
  3:399882
Panel B. Central sample (10 provinces)
1997  2006  0:011868
(0:005477)
  2:166914
1997  2001  0:001420
(0:002992)
 0:474572
2002  2006  0:034073
(0:007618)
  4:472599
Panel C. WEST sample (9 provinces)
1997  2006 0:004012
(0:001985)
 2:021445
1997  2001 0:000343
(0:000623)
0:551241
2002  2006  0:011758
(0:006111)
 1:924081
Figures in parenthese are standard errors
***1% signicant level,**5% signicant level
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Table 3.16. Descriptive Statistics on regional variables (1997-2006)
Varibles Number of observations Mean Standard Deviation
Panel A. EAST sample (10 provinces)
g 100 0:109
(10:9%)
0:02
u 100 2:85% 0:92
Panel B. Central sample (10 provinces)
g 100 0:103
(10:3%)
0:03
u 100 3:50% 0:71
Panel C. WEST sample (9 provinces)
g 90 0:094:
(9:4%)
0:02
u 90 3:85% 0:82
Source: computed by author
g is the "GDP growth rate"
u is the "urban registered unemployment rate"
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Table 3.17. Estimate equation with dependent variable U during 1997-2006
Variables Full sample EAST CENTRAL WESTy
constant 1:703510
(0:301767)
  2:561383
(2:143907)
0:974850
(0:395113)
 2:297389
(0:206061)

g2  54:49003
(21:56805)
  371:2240
(161:2112)
  90:15515
(25:72050)
  78:43072
(23:78040)

g 23:75909
(5:166393)
 95:36929
(37:65610)
 34:41178
(6:549670)
 24:05964
(4:459429)

Adjusted R2 0.78 0.81 0.78 0.92
U is unemployment rate. g is growth rate. yWEST area used xed effect with SUR
Figures in parenthese are standard errors. ***1% signicant level,**5% signicant level
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Table 3.18. Estimate equation with dependent variable g during 1997-2006
variables Full sample EASTy CENTRAL WEST
constant 0:019748
(0:010074)
 0:067158
(0:015763)
 0:050354
(0:041436)
 0:045893
(0:011111)

U2  0:003442
(0:000570)
  0:005454
(0:001560)
 0:001544
(0:003659)
 0:006269
(0:000490)

U 0:036363
(0:004883)
 0:027556
(0:010182)
 0:009283
(0:024942)
0:061769
(0:004794)

Adjusted R2 0:40 0:81 0:30 0:71
U is unemployment rate. g is growth rate. yEAST area based on period 1997-2001
Figures in parenthese are standard errors ***1% signicant level, **5% signicant level
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Table 3.19. Interaction between the speed of transition and unemployment during
1997-2006
variables Full sample
constant  287:1233
(52:11857)

U2  24:97831
(3:890164)

U 176:3222
(28:81680)

Adjusted R2 0:3
U isunemployment rate
Figures in parenthese are standard errors. ***1% signicant level
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Fig. 3.1. Growth rate sample
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Fig. 3.2. Unemployment rate sample
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Fig. 3.3. The Optimal Level of Unemployment U And The Maximal Speed of Transition
_Np
Chapter 4
Liberalization and Economic Integration
among Chinese Regions
4.1 Introduction
Since 1978, China has been undergoing a gradual yet steady liberalization. The changes
were especially profound in the economic sphere but, lately, have been extending also to
the political domain. The three decades of liberalization have had a far-reaching effect on
the Chinese economy and society. Most of the changes have been for the better: China has
been growing rapidly and recently became the second largest economy globally. Yet, the
benets of this expansion have not been universally shared. Large chasms have opened up
between regions (and also within regions). Urban areas in Eastern and South-Eastern China
are increasingly shaping up as relatively rich industrialized and middle-class economies. As
such, they stand it sharp contrast with rural areas and also with urban regions of Central and
Western China, most of which remain relatively poor and underdeveloped. The regional
disparities are further reinforced by the continued enforcement of the hukou system of
household registration which restricts the ability of residents of poor and depressed areas
to move.
The Chinese economy is characterized not only by large inter-regional economic differen-
tials but also by a high degree of economic decentralization. This is highlighted by Xu
(2010) who describes China as a regionally decentralized authoritarian system. He points
out that while the central government controls key political appointment at the regional
level, it allows the regional governments to run their regional economies largely unim-
peded. An even more dramatic example of economic decentralization and divergence was
the creation of special economic zones in the early years of liberalization. This allowed
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selected regions to move faster ahead in terms of economic transformation and laid the
foundations of the subsequent economic gap between the coastal areas and the rest of the
country.
In this chapter, we investigate the changing nature of economic integration among Chi-
nese provinces. The analytical approach is based on identifying shocks affecting the vari-
ous regions and then computing the correlations of such shocks, using the structural VAR
methodology pioneered by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). This analytical framework is
motivated by the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas (Mundell, 1961) and its emphasis on
the importance of asymmetric shocks for the viability of integration. Bayoumi and Eichen-
green applied this methodology to assess the merits of adopting the common currency in
the European Union. Since their seminal contribution, this method has become accepted
as the workhorse for assessing the depth and nature of integration in other regions as well.
Importantly, the structural VAR methodology allows us to distinguish between shocks that
affect both output and the price level permanently (usually denoted as supply shocks in this
literature) and those affecting output only temporarily while having a permanent price-level
effect (demand shocks)22.
Capturing the changing nature of business-cycle23 synchronization in China is interesting
in its own right; to this effect, rst compute and present the correlations of permanent and
temporary shocks for different periods before and after the onset of liberalization in 1978.
We then compare these with values found elsewhere in the literature for the Eurozone and
22 Early studies on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) focused on how the various observable macroeconomic
variables, such as GDP growth rates, ination rates, exchange rates, interest rates and stock prices, are corre-
lated across the economies or the region. However, these approaches do not allow one to distinguish between
the shocks themselves and the reactions to them. Ian Babetskii (2005, p.108) points out that both components
are present in the actual series. Similar results in terms of correlation coefcients might be observed in the
presence of various combinations of shocks and responses to shocks, for example, in the case of a symmetric
reaction to asymmetric shocks or an asymmetric reaction to symmetric shocks.
23 Babetskii (2005, P106) points out that "There is a tendency in the literature to use the terms 'shocks' and
'business cycles' as synonyms. However, the term 'business cycle' has a broader meaning than shock: busi-
ness cycles usually refer to the de-trended components of macroeconomic aggregates such as GDP, industrial
production, employment, eta. Hence, the business cycle represents a mixture of shocks (e.g., export, oil, etc.)
and the responses to them."
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other regional integration arrangements (see Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2003 and 2006, and
the references therein). In this context, the distinction between permanent and temporary
shocks is important: Fidrmuc (2010) formulates a theoretical model of the political econ-
omy of scal federalism and shows that the correlation of permanent shocks is much more
important for the stability of integration than the correlation of temporary shocks.
The analysis does not stop at merely documenting the correlation of permanent and tempo-
rary shocks among Chinese regions. We will also explore the determinants of such corre-
lation using a stylized version of the gravity model (broadly in line with Artis and Okubo,
2008, although they use a different methodology for estimating business-cycle correla-
tions). In this study, we seek to explain the correlations of permanent/temporary shocks by
relating them to factors that proxy for the vulnerability of regions to idiosyncratic shocks
as well as those that reect channels allowing the effects of such shocks to spill over re-
gions' boundaries: the distance between the regions, dummy variables for adjacency, inte-
rior provinces adjacent with coastal provinces and belonging to the same broader region,
economic size of regions, endowments of physical and human capital, infrastructure, struc-
ture of economic activity in each region, openness to (foreign) trade, foreign direct invest-
ment, and economic policy. This allows us to assess which factors contribute to economic
convergence or divergence in the Chinese economy.
In the reminder of this chapter, Section 2 presents a literature review of background about
economic decentralization and fragmentation in China. Section 3 describes the data and
empirical methodology. Section 4 reports the main empirical nding. Section 5 states the
conclusions.
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4.2.1 Economic decentralization in China
Until 1978, Chinese economy remained highly centralized and tightly regulated in which
production and resource allocation were carried out according to a plan designed by the
central government. In the late 1970s, after almost three decades of intense social move-
ment, the central government decided to decentralise administrative power and allowed
local authorities and enterprises to retain part of their revenues. The purpose of this move
was to reinvigorate the stagnant economy by encouraging local enthusiasm in production
(Tang, 1998). From 1979 to 1993, the central scal power gradually weakened: the central
government's share of expenditures (after revenue-sharing) declined from 51 percent to 28
percent (Ma and Norregaard, 1998, as cited in Poncet and Barthélemy, 2008, p.899). Fis-
cal and economic decentralization promoted fast growth of the Chinese economy in the last
three decades. However, some locals have implemented protectionist policies, supposedly
to develop the local economies (Bai, 1981).
The gradual liberalization policy initiated in the late 1970s entailed a clear bias in favour of
the development of coastal regions. The central government gave costal (Eastern) regions
priority in terms of directing foreign investment to them, allowing them to keep a greater
part of their income in foreign currency and to create new nancial instrument which stim-
ulated the development and increased their competitiveness vis-a-vis interior regions (Pon-
cet, 2004). Meanwhile, the inland provinces suffered from the price distortions imposed by
the central government, whereby a part of the production of raw materials was to be sold
at a xed low price. This induced a net transfer of resources from the regions producing
raw materials to the manufacturing provinces on the coast. The less developed regions be-
came very sensitive to the industry-agriculture relative price since industrial products have
a larger prot margin than agricultural products. So, they pursued a policy of industrial-
isation through import substitution, as decentralization combined with the fact that most
of tax revenue accrued from industrial production made them keen to develop their own
industrial bases (Lee, 1998 cited in Poncet, 2004).
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In addition, the household registration system (hukou system) remains a major impediment
to free movement of resources across provinces. Under this system, people cannot move
freely without permission from the authorities. With the economic reform progressing, the
planning system has been giving way to the market oriented system and labor mobility
is higher, especially from inland rural to coastal urban areas (Tang, 1998). Young (2000)
states that the reforms lead to the fragmentation of the domestic market.
In all, China is an economy which is using a single currency yet, capital and labor are not
perfectly mobile. It consists of 22 provinces, 5 Minority Autonomic Area, and 4 Munici-
palities including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing24.
4.2.2 Shocks asymmetry and economic integration in China
Is China an integrated national economy like the US?25 Over the past decade, a grow-
ing number of analysts have attempted to study China's provincial economic integration.
In general, the literature can be classied into four different approaches: production ap-
proach26, trade approach27, price approach28, and business-cycle approach. Their conclu-
sions differ, which in part reects the differences in analytical methodologies as well as
different time period. For example, the World Bank (1994) indicates that industrial struc-
ture across Chinese provinces has remained remarkably constant over time according to the
production approach. Naughton (2003) argues that the production structure approach lacks
a theoretical yardstick to evaluate changes. He examines data on inter-provincial trade29
and nds that Chinese provinces are integrated based on the trade approach. Young (2000)
24 Chongqing was separated from Sichuan province and became the fourth Municipality in 1997.
25 Most economists accept that the US has been integrated national economy during the 19th and 20th
centuries (Naughton, 2003).
26 This approach attempts to measure the degree of economic integration by examining the similarity of
production structure across different provinces (Xu, 2002).
27 Direct examination of data on interprovincial trade ows (Xu, 2002).
28 Price convergence is the most common indicator of the degree of market integration (Xu, 2002).
29 He states that the provincial I-O data are not published and are considered sensitive for commercial and
national security reasons. He got access to the nal-demand columns of 27 provincial I- O for 1992.
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shows that there is no clear cut conclusion based on four different data sets on regional
prices.
Compared with the other approaches to assess economic integration mentioned above,
business-cycle approach has proven to be especially popular. It not only provides a com-
prehensive measure of various factors that contribute to economic fragmentation but also
reveals whether there are any regional groupings of the provincial economies (Tang, 1998).
The focus on asymmetric nature of the business cycles has been widely adopted to gauge
the degree of economic integration of the Chinese provinces in China. Accordingly, regions
within the same country which tend to have high business-cycle correlations are considered
highly integrated.
A number of approaches have been utilized to detect the degree of asymmetry of shocks
across economies  whether these are countries or regions within countries. One method
is based on cross-country correlation of GDP growth rates, ination rates, exchange rates,
interest rates and stock prices. The weakness of this method is that it does not allow one to
distinguish between the shocks themselves and the reactions to them. For example, Poncet
and Barthélemy (2008) investigate business cycles and their determinants by the cyclical
component of monthly data of provincial gross output value of industry uctuations over
1991-2004 which is isolated by ltering their data on regional activity through the Hodrick
and Prescott (1997)'s lter. They emphasize that though a cleavage exists between the
coastal and interior regions, business-cycle synchronization increased from a rather low
level at the beginning of the 1990s to a level comparable to that of the US at the beginning
of the 2000s. Furthermore, they argue that international trade and local economic policy
foster synchronization. However, Carsten et al. (2010) argue that one cannot extrapolate
these results to the new millennium as the observation period might be simply special
with regard to the macroeconomic environment, whereas the business cycle research covers
many more years.
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Another method is to compute shocks using the structural VAR model formulated by
Blachard and Quah (1989) in order to identify the origins of shocks from the responses
to them (supply and demand). This method has became a popular tool for identifying
asymmetric shocks since it was applied by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) to assess
the similarities of economic cycles in Europe in the run-up to the formation of the Euro-
pean Economic and Monetary Union (Babetskii, 2005). The structural VAR methodology
allows us to distinguish between shocks that affect both output and the price level perma-
nently (usually denoted as supply shocks in this literature) and those affecting output only
temporarily while having a permanent price-level effect (demand shocks).30
The literature studying business-cycle synchronization of the Chinese economy using the
VAR method remains very limited. Tang (1998) adopts a structural VAR model to gauge
the degree of economic integration of China using data on industrial output and the retail
price index. He argues that a high degree of integration is found in Eastern China only.
This implies that treating China as a single closely-integrated entity could be misleading.
However, his nding is based on a period spanning 1990Q2- 1995Q4 which is very short
and his nding might also be specic to that period only.
4.2.3 Determinants of business cycle co-movements
There is no consensus on which determinants of business-cycle comovement are partic-
ularly important. There are many potential candidate explanations of business-cycle syn-
chronization or the lack thereof.
30 For example, "Many countries experienced severe negative supply shocks following disruptions to world
oil supplies in 1973 and 1979"(Krugman, Wells and Graddy, 2008, p.685). Some Asian regions such as
Japan, Korea and Singapore exhibited similar pattern of high ination and low output during that period, this
may be explained as they are in the same area and they have similar export oriented economic policy. 2008
Olympic game in Beijing is a good example for demand shock. "The Beijing Statistical Bureau estimates that
spending on the Olympics has added 2.5 percent annually to Beijing's overall economic growth since 2002.
The ripple effect on economic growth not simply in Beijing but in areas surrounding the capital" (Sands,
2009). Though the long term benets of the Olympic game for Beijing is not clear yet, many scholars are
believe that there will be no lasting effects on the city's economy as a result of the games.
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One leading candidate is trade. Frankel and Rose (1998) present empirical evidence that
higher bilateral trade between two countries is associated with more closely correlated
business cycles. However, Krugman (1993) argues the opposite effect should prevail as
international trade increases specialization, making shocks more asymmetric. Based on
Krugman's view, Frankel and Rose (1998) explain that a discussion of the role of interna-
tional trade should distinguish between inter-industry and intra-industry trade. The former
reects specialization and therefore may cause asymmetries. The latter implies that the
country simultaneously exports and imports products of the same category. The total ef-
fect of trade intensity on cycle correlation is therefore theoretically ambiguous and poses
a question that could only be solved empirically. Fidrmuc (2004) adopts the specica-
tion of Frankel and Rose (1998) and applies it to a cross section of OECD countries over
the last ten years with quarterly data, controlling for intra-industry trade in his analysis and
conrms higher bilateral trade between two countries is associated with more closely corre-
lated business cycles. Baxter and Kouparitas (2005) stress that only trade integration has a
robust effect among the various candidate determinants of business cycle synchronization.
Empirical evidence of the positive relationship between similarity in structure of output on
business-cycle synchronization has been stressed in a series of papers by Jean Imbs (1998,
2003, 2004) and also is found in analyses using regional data by Kalemi-Ozcan et al.(2001),
Clark and van Wincoop (2001). Kalemi- Ozcan et al. (2001) nd that U.S. states that are
more specialized have a lower correlation with aggregate U.S. growth.
Gravity variables such as distance between regions, common language, common border,
and so on, have been studied, among others, by Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Calderon
et al. (2002) and Fidrmuc (2002).
Fatás (1997) argues that coordination of monetary and scal policies is also a key deter-
minant of business-cycle synchronization. He points out it has an ambiguous impact on
business cycles since it depends on the type of shocks driving economic uctuations and
the ability of governments to stabilize output. If macroeconomic policies are the source of
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business cycles, more coordinated policy could then lead to higher synchronization. Pon-
cet and Barthélemy (2008), and Lan and Sylwester (2010) examine and conrm this based
on Chinese regional data. Darvas et al. (2007) and Artis et al. (2008) also investigate and
reconrm it based on the European Union data.
Furthermore, factor endowments also drew attention of scholars and most theories, such
as Heckscher-Ohlin theory, Ricardian theories and Hybrid models, predict a signicant
relationship among factor endowments and business-cycle co-movement.
4.3 Data and methodology
This section begins with a description of the datasets, followed by the empirical method-
ology, which contains three aspects: Firstly, we identify supply and demand shocks. Sec-
ondly, we compute the correlation of shocks for different sub-periods. Lastly, we investi-
gate the determinants of business cycle co-movement.
The sample covers 29 provinces based on data availability31. Annual data are available for
1952-2007. Provincial real GDP growth data and the GDP deator are obtained from nom-
inal and real GDP indexes published by the Bureau of National Statistics of China32. The
sample is divided into three geographical regions: EAST, CENTRAL and WEST; besides
reecting geography, this categorization also broadly captures differences in the degree of
economic development. During the early transition period, the coastal areas in the East
beneted from the open door policy, developing much more quickly than the interior ar-
eas in the Central and Western regions. Furthermore, we divide the 53 years33 covered
by the data into four uneven sub-periods: 1955-1965, 1966-1977, 1978-1991 and 1992-
31 Tibet and Chongqing are dropped from our sample due to missing data. The data for Sichuan is available
from 1978.
32 We used the following publications: `Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials 50 years of New
China', China Labour Statistical Yearbook and provincial statistical book.
33 The sample that we actually analyze is slightly shorter than the period covered by the raw data period
since we need to use lags.
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2007. This break-down corresponds to different phases of China's history. We call the
rst two sub-periods early Maoist period and late Maoist period; during these, China re-
mained ab highly centralized planned economy. The early Maoist period includes the Great
Leap Forward (1958-1961) while the late Maoist period overlaps with the Cultural Revolu-
tion (1966-1976). Chinese economic reform was initiated in 1978 and China maintained a
high real GDP growth averaging 8-10% during the last three decades (Xu, 2007). The post
Maoist period is also split into two sub-periods for two reasons: First, market reforms un-
derwent a major step forward occurring following Deng Xiaoping's South Trip in 1992.
This year thus marked the start of a new phase of China's reform process (Fleisher et al.
2009). Second, Xu (2007) argues that it was highly possible that a structural break occurred
in this year.
4.3.1 Identication of supply and demand shocks
In this subsection, we present the methodology used to identify the supply and demand
shocks in different economies. We use a structural VAR model with two variables, (the
log of) output (annual real GDP) and (the log of) prices (annual GDP deator). It is as-
sumed that uctuations in these two variables result from two types of distribances: supply
and demand shocks. Supply shocks, which are associated with a shift in the aggregate sup-
ply curve, have both short-term and long-term impacts on both output and prices. Demand
shocks also have short-term effects on both variables. However, since the long-term aggre-
gate supply curve is vertical, demand shocks do not have a long-term effect on the level of
output.
Following Blanchard and Quah (1989), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) and Babetskii
(2005) we estimate a VAR with the differences of GDP yt and the difference of price level
pt as variables.The following VAR representation can be estimated:
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Where yt = logGDPt   logGDPt 1 and pt = logPt   logPt 1. bijk are coefcients, and
k is the lag length . eyt and e
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structural and can be decomposed by Equation (4.43):
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where "Dt and "St are demand and supply disturbances, respectively. These equations state
that the unexplainable components in the movements of output growth and ination are
linear combinations of supply and demand shocks. The vector of the structural disturbances
"t can be obtained under restrictions:
1: c211 + c
2
12 = V ar(e
y)
2: c221 + c
2
22 = V ar(e
p)
3: c11c21 + c12c22 = Cov(e
y; ep)
4:
1P
k=0
c11"
D
t k = 0
The rst three restrictions on the coefcients of Equation (4.43) are directly derived from
Equation (4.44) and Equation (4.45) using normalization conditions:
(i) the variance of demand and supply shocks is unity:
V ar("D) = V ar("S) = 1; (4.44)
(ii) demand and supply shocks are orthogonal:
Cov("D; "S) = 0; (4.45)
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The fourth restriction on coefcients cij states that demand shocks have no long term impact
on the level of output.
4.3.2 Estimation of correlation of supply/demand shocks
We rst calculate ij which is the correlation of supply/demand shocks between a pair of
provinces i and j. If the correlation of shocks is positive, the shocks are considered to
be symmetric and if it is negative, they are considered asymmetric. Table 4.20 and Table
4.21 gives the weighted average34 correlation of supply shock and demand shocks for each
province and for each sub-period, respectively. Figures 4.4-4.7 depict the distribution of
bilateral cross correlation of supply shocks for sub-periods 1955-1965, 1966-1977, 1978-
1991 and 1992-2007. Figures 4.8-4.11 provide the same information for demand shocks. It
is clear that the nature of shocks changed over the periods considered. However, the change
is not the same for the two kinds of shocks. The correlations of supply shocks computed for
more recent periods suggest a lower degree of cohesion. However, more recent correlations
of demand shocks suggest a greater degree of cohesion.
The focus on the symmetry of shocks is typically associated with the optimum currency
area(OCA) literature (Mundell, 1961). Indeed, Bayoumi and Eichengreen's article pioneer-
ing the use of structural VARs to analyze business-cycle synchronization was motivated by
Mundell.s theory. If shocks are symmetric, the argument goes, the regions/countries shar-
ing the same currency will have little need for independent monetary policy. With asym-
metric shocks, policy preferences can diverge: a region hit by a negative shock would prefer
loose monetary policy while another affected by a positive shock would be instead in favor
of a monetary tightening. The OCA theory, however, considers only the overall symmetry
of shocks, without distinguishing between demand and supply shocks. Therefore, it gives
us little guidance for the evaluation of cases such as China.s where falling correlation of
supply shocks seems counter-balanced by increasing symmetry of demand shocks.
34 Weighted by GDP.
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Fidrmuc (2011), in contrast, formulates a model of scal integration that makes the dis-
tinction between permanent and temporary output shocks (recall that supply shocks affect
output permanently while demand shocks only have a temporary effect). He shows that
symmetry of permanent shocks is more important for the stability of integration than sym-
metry of temporary shocks: both kinds of shocks give rise to divergent policy preferences
but the impact of temporary shocks is (by denition) short lived while permanent shocks
can fundamentally undermine the stability of integration. In this context, the fact that China
is experiencing falling correlation of supply (permanent) shocks may come across as wor-
rying, despite the change in opposite direction taken by the correlation demand (temporary)
shocks.
4.3.3 The determinants of business cycle co-movement
In this section, the objective is to investigate the determinants of business cycle co-movements.
Co-movements of shocks across countries and regions are used for the assessment of OCA
criteria. In China, it can be used to examine how the effect of reform on Chinese ecomomy.
A high correlation between two regions shocks indicates that the economic structures of
the countries or regions are quite similar and the cost of a common monetary policy is
low. However, the degree of regional integration has important macroeconomic implica-
tions especially for monetary policy. For example, if two regions, i and j, are in different
economic situations with region i experiencing high unemployment and region j high in-
ation, to adjust the unemployment in region i, the central bank has to increase the money
supply. However, to solve the high ination pressure for region j, the central bank has to
reduce the money supply. In this example, conducting monetary policies by the central
bank becomes more difcult since different regions are not be found in similar business
cycle stages (Xu, 2002).
In order to investigate and nd the determinants of the business cycle correlation, we
take the following steps. Firstly, we use univariate OLS estimates to assess the nature
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of the relationship between bilateral correlation coefcients and each individual variable:
^ij = +Xij+. Secondly, we repeat the same procedure but apply the Fishier z trans-
formation on the dependant variable, bilateral cross-correlation coefcients, to overcome
the potential bias as the values are bound between 1 and+1. This implies that the estima-
tion equation takes the following form: 1
2
log(
1+ij
1 ij ) = + Xij + "ij . Thirdly, a further
robustness check includes a set of dummy variables and all variables that proved signicant
during the earlier two steps.35 The form is: ij = + Xij +Dij + "ij , 12 log(
1+ij
1 ij ) =
 + Xij + Dij + "ij . Following Frankel and Rose (1998), Imbs(2004), Calderon et
al.(2007), and Poncet and Barthélemy (2008), we estimate the variance-covariance matrix
of  using White (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity.
Following the literature review on determinants of business-cycle co-movement in sec-
tion 3.2.3, the following vaiables are studied: 4 dummy variables (common border, coast,
provinces belonging to the same region, and interior province which have common bor-
der with coastal provinces). The other control variables are: size, distance, similarity of
production structure, dissimilarity of local policy, international trade, FDI, capital invest-
ment/xed asset investment and human capital. Now, we turn to a detailed consideration
of each group of variables.
Gravity variables
There is abundant evidence in the existing literature that the gravity variables can explain
bilateral trade (see Frankel and Rose, 1998). The commonly-used gravity variables are:
common border, sameregion dummy, coast-intra, interior- coast border, bilateral distance,
and size. The rst dummy variable (common border) equals 1 when province i and j are
adjacent and 0 otherwise. The second dummy (the same region) equals 1 when province i
and j are in the same geographic region36 and 0 otherwise. The third dummy (coast-intra)
35 Another alternative way is tried (general to specic) also which starts with a relatively broad regression
and then gradually drops insignicant variables. However, the variable sign is not consistent before and after
dropping some insignicant variables of. The way which is adopted here lets us draw robust results.
36 The sample can be divided to three regions, EAST, CENTRAL and WEST.
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equals 1 when provinces i and j are both located in the coastal region and 0 otherwise. The
fourth dummy (interior-coast border) equals 1 when provinces i and j are located on either
side of the border separating the interior and coastal regions and 0 otherwise37. Bilateral
distance data are calculated as the shortest distance for cargo transportation by railway in
kilometres. Size is the sum of GDPs38 of two provinces. Gravity variables are especially
important to our study since no data are available on bilateral trade ows between Chinese
provinces. Hence, by controlling for a set of standard gravity variables, we are proxying for
the bilateral-trade opportunities between the two provinces. Poncet and Barthélemy (2008)
use the freight trafc volume through the railway system between and within provinces as a
proxy, which is very unreliable, and they also stressed that railway freight volume is a truly
imperfect proxy for domestic trade, especially in the preliminary stage of the reform. For
example, coal, grain, iron and steel account for well over half of railroad freight volume,
they make up at most 10% - 20% of the value of inter-provincial trade (pp.918).
Similarity of production structure
There are no standard measures of similarity in the production structure. Following Clark
and van Wincoop (2001), Imb (2004) and Poncet and Barthélemy (2008), Krugman's
(1991) absolute value index was adopted in this study. Let Sni and Snj denote the GDP
shares for industry n in province i and j, respectively. Then, the dissimilarity of province
i's and province j's production structure is measured as 1
N
NX
n=1
jSni   Snjj. It is measured
by covering 5 sectors for all Chinese provinces39.
37 This dummy variable is investigated by Poncet and Barthélemy (2008)
38 The same method adopted by Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and they state that measuring size with GDP
or population yields similar results.
39 Sectors are: 1. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry, Fishing, Mining and Quarrying; 2. Construction; 3.
Manufacturing; 4. Transportation Post and Telecommunications; 5. Wholesale Retail & Catering Trade.
Data are taken from Chinese national statistic year book.
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Dissimilarity of Local policy
Provincial dissimilarity of local policy is measured by means of two indicators. One is to
capture provincial divergence by scal policy and another is to investigate provincial het-
erogeneity in terms of ination to reveal local economic autonomy. Similar to Clark and
van Wincoop (2001) and Poncet and Barthélemy (2008), we use the standard deviation of
provincial budget decit differentials to measure dissimilarity of scal policy. Annual bud-
get decit data are expressed as a percentage of GDP. To capture provincial divergence of
economic autonomy, we use 1
T
X
t
jGPIi;t  GPIj;tj which was used by Boyreau-Debray
(2000) and Poncet and Barthélemy (2008) as well40. GPIi;t is the general price index of
the province i during the period t. T is the sub-period time span.
Dissimilarity of openness
To investigate the dissimilarity of provincial openness degree, we use two indicators of
international trade and Foreign Direct Investment. International trade dissimilarity is com-
puted as 1
T
X
t
jTradei;t   Tradej;tj. Tradei;t correspond to the percentage share of trade
in GDP of province i during period t. T is the sub-period time span. Similar formula is
used for dissimilarity of FDI.
Factor endowments
In this study, we consider two factors of production: human capital and public capital in-
vestment/xed asset investment41. Human capital is measured as secondary and higher
education enrolment rates (i.e. the ratio of the total secondary and higher education enrol-
ment to the population) which follows Islam (1995). Public capital investment/xed asset
40 They used comsumer price index which is not available for our observation period 1955-2007.
41 Fixed asset investment data is available from 1978.
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investment is expressed as a percentage of GDP. The dissimilarity indexes are computed in
line with the above variables.
4.4 Empirical results
Table 4.23, 4.24 4.25 and 4.26 present the coefcients of univariate regressions between
each variable considered in our study and the correlation of supply shocks and demand
shocks. Table 4.27 to 4.32 present the regression results for each sub-period which include
the all signicant variables based on previous individual regression tests. In addition, we
also report further regressions with some variables dropped since they are multi-collinear.
For comparison, regressions results are reported both for the original data and Fisher z
transformations.
4.4.1 Maoist periods with central planning economic system
(1955-1965, 1966-1977)
Table 4.23 shows univariate regression results, based on the two methods considered. It
can be found that the variables considered in this study hardly explain the inter-provincial
correlation of supply shocks in China. Table 4.25 shows that the variables also have little
explanatory power with respect to the correlation of demand shocks during the period of
1955-1965. However, over the second sub-period 1966-1977, the common border dummy
is positive and signicant, distance is negative and signicant, size is positive and sig-
nicant and dissimilarity of capital investment appears with negative and signicant sign.
Adjacent provinces have higher correlation of demand shocks, large provinces tend to trade
more with each other and thus have higher correlation of demand shocks, and two distant
provinces have lower correlation of demand shocks. Moreover, higher correlation of de-
mand shocks between provinces could be the result of the provinces with higher capital
investment. Table 4.28 reports there is no signicant effect for adjacent provinces which is
4.4 Empirical results 110
in line with the empirical evidence of Clark and van Wincoop (2001) and Barrios and de
Lucio (2003) that the set of explanatory variables can explain part (not all) of the border
effect.
4.4.2 Early period of economic reform with market oriented economic
system (1978-1991)
Table 4.24 shows univariate regression results, based on the two methods considered. The
correlation of supply shocks can be explained by coast_intra dummy with positive sign,
size with positive sign, dissimilarity of xed asset investment with negative sign, dissimi-
larity of international trade with positive sign which are all expected signs. This result in-
dicates: Coastal provinces are characterized by higher correlation of supply shocks. Large
provinces tend to have higher correlation of supply shocks. Provinces with similar xed
asset investment have higher correlation of supply shocks. Provinces with similar inter-
national trade have higher correlation of supply shocks. Poncet and Barthélemy (2008, p.
921) note that international trade acts as a stabilizing force and facilitates regional adjust-
ment to idiosyncratic shocks, especially in a context of poor domestic integration. How-
ever, Table 4.29 reports that dissimilarity of international trade has no signicant effect
when included other explanation variables.
Table 4.26 shows univariate regression results, based on the two methods considered. The
correlation of cross provinces demand shocks can be explained by dissimilarity of standard
deviation with negative sign, dissimilarity of production structure with negative sign, size
with negative sign, and dissimilarity of GPI with positive sign. The signs of the rst two
variables are expected which suggest that the greater local policy divergence, the lower cor-
relation of demand shocks, and a higher similarity in production structures across provinces
is likely to be associated with greater demand shocks correlations. These ndings are in
line with Clark and van Wincoop (2001), Barrios and de Lucio (2003), Imbs (2004), Pon-
cet and Barthélemy (2008)'s ndings. However, the rest of variables are signicant with
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opposite sign compared with theory and existing empirical evidence. Table 4.30 reports the
robust results when all the signicant variables are included based on univariate regressions
(see Table 4.26) and the results are quite surprising. The dissimilarity of standard devia-
tion of scal decit and dissimilarity of production structure are insignicant. The rest of
signicant variables are of opposite sign which is not in line with previous literature.
4.4.3 Deep economic reform period with market oriented economic
system (1992-2007)
Table 4.24 shows univariate regression based on the two methods to be considered. The
correlation of supply shocks can be explained by common border dummy with positive
sign, same_region dummy with negative sign, coast_region dummy with positive sign, dis-
similarity of capital investment and dissimilarity of xed asset investment with negative
sign. Table 4.31 reports robust results after considering multi collinearity, it indicates that
adjacent provinces have higher correlation of supply shocks, coastal provinces are char-
acterized by higher correlation of supply shocks, and provinces with similar xed asset
investment/capital investment42 have higher correlation of supply shocks.
Table 4.26 shows the univariate estimates based on the two methods considered, the cor-
relation of cross provinces demand shocks can be explained by dissimilarity of xed asset
investment with positive sign, dissimilarity of human capital with negative sign and dissim-
ilarity of international trade with negative sign. Table 4.32 reports the robust results when
we add all signicant variables. It indicates that higher correlation of demand shocks be-
tween provinces could be the result of the provinces with similar human capital investment;
However, our results indicate higher correlation of demand shocks in provinces with lower
similarity of xed asset capital investment.
42 Multi collinear is observed between capital investment and xed asset investment.
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4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, the correlations of supply or demand shocks in China has been examined.
Supply and demand shocks were recovered from structural vector autoregressive mod-
els. The sample period was divided into four uneven sub-periods: 1955-1965, 1966-1977,
1978-1991, and 1992-2007 which corresponds to different phases of China's economic re-
form. The key ndings of this study are as follows.
(i) The degree of bilateral cross correlation of supply shocks suggests a fall in the cohesion
between Chinese regions. However, the bilateral cross correlation of demand shocks has
increased, which in turn suggest a greater degree of cohesion.
(ii) Under central planning economic system, the variables I considered in the study do not
to explain the correlation of supply or demand shocks across provinces in China.
(iii) Distance between two provinces is robustly correlated with a higher cross provinces
correlation of demand shock in the early period (1966-1977). With the development of
electric railways which started from 1958, the effect of distance fades away.
(iii) Two variables were found to be robust explaining the correlation of supply shocks
across provinces during the recent two period of 1978-1991 and 1992-2007. Coastal
provinces and those with similar xed asset investment are characterized by higher cor-
relation of supply shocks.
(iv) Greater similarity in production structure is not robustly correlated with correlation
of supply or demand shocks. Although it is signicant in the univariate regression and
has positive relationship with the correlation of demand shocks during the period 1992-
2007, the signicance disappears when other explanatory variables are added. Baxter and
Kouparitas (2005) also cannot nd robust results based on over 100 countries dataset and
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doubt about the ndings of Imbs (1998, 2003, and 2004) which stress the importance of
industrial structure.
(v) We do not nd any link between scal policy coordination and the correlation of sup-
ply and demand shocks. This nding is in line with the empirical ndings of Clark and van
Wincoop (2001) who conjecture that it could be an indirect link through the effect of com-
mon policies on trade. In the early period of economic reform, the coastal areas in the East
have particularly beneted from the open door policy.
In conclusion, this chapter investigates to study the correlation of business cycle among
Chinese provinces and seeks to explain the relationship between business cycle co-movement
and other economic variables.
4.6 Tables and Figures 114
4.6 Tables and Figures
4.6 Tables and Figures 115
Table 4.20. Weighted average supply shocks's correlation by province
Region Province name 1955-1965 1966-1977 1978-1991 1992-2007
Beijing 0.61 0.54 0.41 0.26
Tianjin 0.77 0.37 0.48 0.34
EAST Shanghai 0.68 0.35 0.49 0.33
Liaoning 0.78 0.27 0.38 -0.35
Shandong 0.63 0.38 0.46 0.29
Jiangsu 0.39 0.53 0.37 0.27
Zhejiang 0.68 0.10 0.53 0.35
Fujian 0.69 0.35 0.49 0.37
Guangdong 0.65 0.35 0.38 0.41
Hebei 0.71 0.42 0.50 0.25
Shanxi 0.78 0.50 0.23 0.03
CENTRAL Inner-Mongolia 0.65 0.46 0.18 0.10
Jilin 0.73 0.49 0.35 0.33
Heilongjian 0.78 0.40 0.37 0.09
Anhui 0.48 -0.09 -0.21 0.09
Jiangxi 0.43 0.45 0.39 0.36
Henan 0.71 0.34 0.19 -0.12
Hunan 0.78 0.52 0.36 0.38
Hubei 0.72 0.48 0.37 0.16
Guangxi 0.76 0.24 0.42 0.43
Sichuan - - 0.46 0.32
Guizhou 0.82 0.35 0.29 0.08
WEST Yunnan 0.58 0.38 0.35 0.32
Shaanxi 0.78 0.36 0.39 -0.04
Gansu 0.61 0.19 0.33 0.20
Ningxia 0.56 0.32 0.25 -0.26
Qinghai 0.69 0.23 0.39 0.11
Xinjiang 0.59 0.51 0.29 0.27
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Table 4.21. Weighted average Demand shocks's correlation by province
Region Province name 1955-1965 1966-1977 1978-1991 1992-2007
Beijing 0.01 0.05 0.43 0.60
Tianjin 0.20 0.23 0.47 0.66
EAST Shanghai 0.18 0.16 0.34 0.73
Liaoning -0.18 0.17 0.17 0.50
Shandong 0.21 0.07 0.19 0.51
Jiangsu -0.07 0.18 0.37 0.76
Zhejiang 0.26 0.08 0.41 0.75
Fujian 0.18 -0.13 0.48 0.74
Guangdong 0.18 0.10 0.37 0.66
Hebei 0.17 0.09 0.49 0.71
Shanxi 0.05 0.20 0.38 0.66
CENTRAL Inner-Mongolia 0.05 -0.02 0.44 0.79
Jilin 0.19 0.03 0.10 0.60
Heilongjian 0.11 0.30 0.20 0.75
Anhui -0.18 0.29 0.40 0.66
Jiangxi 0.21 0.14 0.45 0.66
Henan -0.07 0.29 0.37 0.72
Hunan 0.18 -0.17 0.38 0.78
Hubei 0.08 0.10 0.39 0.75
Guangxi 0.14 0.02 0.53 0.70
Sichuan - - 0.32 0.68
Guizhou 0.23 0.16 0.53 0.77
WEST Yunnan 0.16 -0.18 0.28 0.58
Shaanxi 0.14 0.22 0.26 0.67
Gansu 0.14 -0.24 0.21 0.36
Ningxia 0.16 -0.04 0.49 0.73
Qinghai 0.12 -0.10 0.37 0.71
Xinjiang -0.08 -0.15 0.38 0.68
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Table 4.22. Sub-groups
Sample Observations
East Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Liaoning, Shandong,Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan
Central Hebei, Shanxi, Inner-Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang,Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Hubei
West Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunan, Sichuan, Shaanxi,Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang
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Table 4.23. OLS univariate estimates regression of cross-province correlation of supply
shocks, before reform
variables 1955  1965 1966  1977
o z o z
common border 0:028157
(0:031775)
[0:002425]
0:048582
(0:062398)
[0:001873]
0:040173
(0:044468)
[0:002520]
0:047516
(0:055910)
[0:002231]
distance 2:07E   06
(1:10E 05)
[0:000110]
 0:000606
(0:034733)
[0:000001]
 6:70E   06
(1:53E 05)
[0:000590]
 0:014926
(0:031116)
[0:000712]
size 0:000568
(0:000361)
[0:007588]
0:060311
(0:049827)
[0:004515]
 0:000343
(0:000254)
[0:005650]
 0:027246
(0:041057)
[0:001362]
dissimilarity of
capital investment
 0:336200
(0:169711)
[0:012004]
 0:037162
(0:030349)
[0:004621]
 0:268362
(0:241338)
[0:003814]
0:008314
(0:024251)
[0:000364]
dissimilarity of
human capital
0:018180
(0:017182)
[0:003454]
0:032628
(0:018441)
[0:009599]
0:015472
(0:047604)
[0:000328]
 0:009189
(0:021297)
[0:000578]
dissimilarity of GPI  0:000604
(0:001503)
[0:000500]
0:040185
(0:041364)
[0:002913]
 0:002502
(0:002149)
[0:004181]
 0:038544
(0:022564)
[0:008953]
dissimilarity of standard
deviation of sical decit
0:221947
(0:187832)
[0:004304]
0:049456
(0:037616)
[0:005323]
 0:810108
(0:535593)
[0:007033]
 0:087079
(0:041178)
[0:013656]
number of observations: 325 325 325 325
Figures in ( ) are standard errors. Figures in [ ] are R2
***1% signicant level,**5% signicant level, *10% signicant level
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher z tranformation and log(variables)
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Table 4.24. OLS univariate estimates regression of cross-province correlation of supply
shocks, after reform
variables 1978  1991 1992  2007
o z o z
common border 0:023345
(0:037581)
[0:001025]
0:044330
(0:045354)
[0:002534]
0:130154
(0:051851)
[0:016482]
0:154216
(0:062148)
[0:016112]
same region 0:039198
(0:029714)
[0:004607]
0:056307
(0:035853)
[0:006517]
0:084523
(0:041183)
[0:011079]
0:100917
(0:049355)
[0:010997]
coast_intra 0:221088
(0:046338)
[0:057088]
0:276857
(0:055838)
[0:061369]
0:195236
(0:065587)
[0:023024]
0:257427
(0:078403)
[0:027873]
coast_interior border 0:054391
(0:070802)
[0:001567]
0:076551
(0:085488)
[0:002128]
 0:039507
(0:098507)
[0:000428]
 0:048638
(0:118047)
[0:000451]
distance  2:13E   05
(1:36E 05)
[0:006451]
 0:055849
(0:026435)
[0:011732]
1:10E   06
(1:90E 05)
[0:000009]
 0:025725
(0:036664)
[0:001308]
size 0:000346
(7:40E 05)
[0:054782]
0:138312
(0:033675)
[0:042939]
5:78E   06
(1:85E 05)
[0:000259]
0:009697
(0:040324)
[0:000154]
dissimilarity of
capital investment
 0:202189
(0:242573)
[0:001844]
 0:013527
(0:020732)
[0:001131]
 1:327728
(0:384416)
[0:030751]
 0:101748
(0:036837)
[0:019888]
dissimilarity of xed
asset investment
 1:831116
(0:348473)
[0:068412]
 0:148670
(0:029156)
[0:064679]
 0:897178
(0:330894)
[0:019177]
 0:080585
(0:040774)
[0:010282]
dissimilarity of
human capital
0:503795
(1:877101)
[0:000192]
0:015454
(0:027268)
[0:000853]
 4:272693
(3:910434)
[0:003165]
 0:051782
(0:045384)
[0:003450]
dissimilarity of GPI 0:016084
(0:012270)
[0:004549]
0:042656
(0:033941)
[0:004183]
0:041759
(0:025354)
[0:007163]
0:086882
(0:055054)
[0:006580]
dissimilarity of standard
deviation of sical decit
0:517423
(0:352769)
[0:005689]
0:021295
(0:022140)
[0:002454]
 0:731659
(1:128675)
[0:001116]
 0:054555
(0:037963)
[0:005462]
dissimilarity of
production structure
0:101360
(0:076309)
[0:004670]
0:037248
(0:027723)
[0:004778]
0:211801
(0:207825)
[0:002755]
0:025112
(0:052348)
[0:000612]
dissimilarity of FDI 2:892671
(2:466734)
[0:003644]
0:026751
(0:011721)
[0:013664]
0:179763
(0:721279)
[0:000165]
0:005275
(0:024454)
[0:000124]
dissimilarity of
international trade
0:205564
(0:106799)
[0:009757]
0:038594
(0:012968)
[0:023013]
0:046245
(0:046314)
[0:002645]
 0:005189
(0:015493)
[0:000298]
number of observations: 378 378 378 378
Figures in ( ) are standard errors. Figures in [ ] are R2
***1% signicant level,**5% signicant level, *10% signicant level
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher z tranformation and log(variables)
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Table 4.25. OLS univariate estimates regression of cross-province correlation of demand
shocks, before reform
variables 1955  1965 1966  1977
o z o z
common border 0:016038
(0:058028)
[0:000236]
0:012693
(0:067104)
[0:000111]
0:167365
(0:053691)
[0:029205]
0:179765
(0:060920)
[0:026251]
distance 4:98E   08
(2:00E 05)
[0:000000]
0:022808
(0:037298)
[0:001156]
 0:000105
(1:78E 05)
[0:096647]
 0:175933
(0:032907)
[0:081301]
size  0:000997
(0:000659)
[0:007033]
 0:051080
(0:053583)
[0:002806]
0:000839
(0:000308)
[0:022488]
0:094533
(0:045008)
[0:013474]
dissimilarity of
capital investment
 0:103934
(0:311406)
[0:000345]
 0:027562
(0:032648)
[0:002202]
 1:208475
(0:288197)
[0:051627]
 0:101415
(0:026151)
[0:044490]
dissimilarity of
human capital
0:004045
(0:031397)
[0:000051]
0:003724
(0:019909)
[0:000108]
0:055264
(0:058134)
[0:002799]
 0:003252
(0:023473)
[0:000060]
dissimilarity of GPI  0:003036
(0:002737)
[0:003793]
 0:068216
(0:044347)
[0:007272]
 0:002924
(0:002630)
[0:003810]
 0:041937
(0:024890)
[0:008713]
dissimilarity of standard
deviation of sical decit
0:150066
(0:343279)
[0:000591]
 0:010881
(0:040521)
[0:000223]
 0:732635
(0:656563)
[0:003840]
 0:064897
(0:045588)
[0:006235]
number of observations: 325 325 325 325
Figures in ( ) are standard errors. Figures in [ ] are R2
***1% signicant level,**5% signicant level, *10% signicant level
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher z tranformation and log(variables)
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Table 4.26. OLS univariate estimates regression of cross-province correlation of demand
shocks, after reform
variables 1978  1991 1992  2007
o z o z
common border 0:023834
(0:037145)
[0:001094]
0:046782
(0:047124)
[0:002614]
0:020040
(0:023144)
[0:001990]
0:037709
(0:042607)
[0:002079]
same region  0:023149
(0:029414)
[0:001645]
 0:031228
(0:037340)
[0:001857]
0:011592
(0:018341)
[0:001061]
0:031778
(0:033743)
[0:002353]
coast_intra  0:012962
(0:047163)
[]
 0:017831
(0:059879)
[0:000236]
 0:039961
(0:029331)
[0:004912]
 0:057588
(0:054049)
[0:003010]
coast_interior border 0:041835
(0:070004)
[0:000949]
0:092028
(0:088795)
[0:002849]
 0:068357
(0:043516)
[0:006520]
 0:146728
(0:080019)
[0:008863]
distance  2:39E   05
(1:35E 05)
[0:008339]
 0:037748
(0:027561)
[0:004964]
 1:13E   05
(8:41E 06)
[0:004779]
 0:030809
(0:024924)
[0:004047]
size  0:000299
(7:37E 05)
[0:041990]
 0:135683
(0:035076)
[0:038274]
 1:25E   05
(8:18E 06)
[0:006195]
 0:048086
(0:027339)
[0:008160]
dissimilarity of
capital investment
0:238076
(0:239674)
[0:002617]
0:008761
(0:021549)
[0:000439]
0:389290
(0:171852)
[0:013464]
0:025987
(0:025293)
[0:002800]
dissimilarity of xed
asset investment
0:728007
(0:354885)
[0:011068]
0:031695
(0:031282)
[0:002723]
0:327238
(0:147085)
[0:012993]
0:050676
(0:027777)
[0:008774]
dissimilarity of
human capital
 1:064335
(1:854753)
[0:000875]
 0:010069
(0:028341)
[0:000336]
 2:411289
(1:731047)
[0:005134]
 0:057103
(0:030807)
[0:009055]
dissimilarity of GPI 0:040543
(0:011975)
[0:029585]
0:107509
(0:034903)
[0:024612]
0:007895
(0:011268)
[0:001304]
0:000705
(0:037600)
[0:000001]
dissimilarity of standard
deviation of sical decit
 0:786255
(0:347326)
[0:013446]
 0:057348
(0:022843)
[0:016487]
0:478487
(0:499800)
[0:002432]
0:021793
(0:025889)
[0:001881]
dissimilarity of
production structure
 0:155250
(0:075178)
[0:011215]
 0:077501
(0:028596)
[0:019160]
 0:115586
(0:092024)
[0:004178]
 0:057319
(0:035523)
[0:006877]
dissimilarity of FDI 0:493072
(2:442522)
[0:000108]
0:001729
(0:012263)
[0:000053]
 0:446336
(0:318804)
[0:005186]
 0:024001
(0:016601)
[0:005528]
dissimilarity of
international trade
 0:152044
(0:105792)
[0:005463]
 0:019970
(0:013594)
[0:005707]
 0:045081
(0:020417)
[0:012800]
 0:030514
(0:010430)
[0:022259]
number of observations: 378 378 378 378
Figures in ( ) are standard errors. Figures in [ ] are R2
***1% signicant level,**5% signicant level, *10% signicant level
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher z tranformation and log(variables)
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Table 4.27. Estimates of of cross-province correlation of supply shocks (1955-1966,
1966-1977)
variables 1955-1965 1966-1977
o z o z
constant 0:688744
(0:020120)
1:044120
(0:093624)
  0:175746
(0:119948)
dissimilarity of
capital investment  0:336200

(0:169711)
     
dissimilarity of
human capital   0:032628

(0:018441)
   
dissimilarity of GPI        0:033231
(0:022639)
dissimilarity of standard
deviation of sical decit        0:079661

(0:041414)
number of obsevations 325 325 325
R2 0:012 0:010   0:020
Figures in ( ) are standard errors.
***1% signicant level,**5% signicant level, *10% signicant level
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher z tranformation and log(variables)
.
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Table 4.31. OLS estimates of cross-province correlation of supply shocks (1992-2007)
variables (1) (2)
o z o z
constant 0:150881
(0:059293)
 0:045445
(0:107708)
0:132814
(0:055184)
0:001078
(0:105391)
common border 0:124094
(0:051910)
0:128492
(0:065003)
0:128157
(0:049160)
0:130177
(0:060859)
same region  0:003619
(0:044620)
 0:015869
(0:052936)
   
coast_intra 0:194820
(0:086171)
0:253545
(0:108196)
0:205914
(0:079754)
0:257652
(0:101402)
dissimilarity of
capital investment  0:585795(0:556194)  0:065553(0:051288)    
dissimilarity of xed
asset investment  0:474180(0:536941)  0:020523(0:063594)  0:846228

(0:360634)
 0:072825
(0:042179)
dissimilarity of GPI 0:060553
(0:024758)
  0:065424
(0:024660)
 
number of obsevations 378 378 378 378
adjusted R2 0:057 0:041 0:060 0:043
Figures in ( ) are standard errors.
***1% signicant level,**5% signicant level, *10% signicant level
o: results based on original data, z: results based on Fisher z tranformation and log(variables)
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Fig. 4.4. Cross provinces' correlation of supply shocks 1955-1965
Fig. 4.5. Cross provinces' correlation of supply shocks 1966-1977
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Fig. 4.6. Cross provinces' correlation of supply shocks 1978-1991
Fig. 4.7. Cross provinces' correlation of supply shocks 1992-2007
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Fig. 4.8. Cross provinces' correlation of demand shocks 1955-1965
Fig. 4.9. Cross provinces' correlation of demand shocks 1966-1977
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Fig. 4.10. Cross provinces' correlation of demand shocks 1978-1991
Fig. 4.11. Cross provinces' correlation of demand shocks 1992-2007
Chapter 5
Conclusions
The objective of this thesis is to study the macroeconomic performance of China and
China's growth experience during the transition period from central planning to market
oriented economic system. The economic reform was initiated in 1978. China has been ex-
periencing rapid economic growth, since then, recently becoming the second largest econ-
omy globally. However, the progress of reform has been uneven and the fruits of reform
differ across regions. As a result, large differences emerged with the degree of economic
development among the regions of China. Urban areas in Eastern and South-Eastern China
are increasingly shaping up as they beneted a lot from the open-door policy. As a re-
sult, they are developing much more quickly than the interior areas of Central and Western
China. In order to improve local enthusiasm in production and promote fast growth of their
local economies, the government implemented economic decentralization. The Chinese
economy is thus characterized by large inter-regional economic differentials and a high de-
gree of economic decentralization. In addition, urban employment system changed from a
system of centrally xed wages and lifetime secure employment to a mostly market-based
system. Privatization of state owned enterprises was initiated and unemployment in urban
areas emerged during the period of economic transition and structural adjustment in the
late 1990s. Unemployment has increased signicantly during last two decades, and has
become one of the most pressing problems of the Chinese economy today. Based on the re-
gional disparity on the background of rapid growth, we focused my study on the following
aspects.
In Chapter 2 we explore the impact of foreign direct investment on growth by using a panel
of Chinese provincial data spanning 1978-2008 China's remarkable growth performance
over the last three decades is widely attributed to foreign direct investment. Attracting
foreign direct investment has been the main motivation of Chinese open door policy. We
132
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estimate an augmented Solow growth model which relates output growth to investment
in human and physical capital and population growth. We then introduce FDI into the
model to compare if convergence within broader regions is faster. Our main nding is that
the effect of FDI on economic growth in different provinces is positive and statistically
signicant. More generally, my analysis indicates that the augmented Solow growth model
appears to provide a good description of regional growth patterns in China over the period
1978-2008. Conditional convergence becomes even stronger after splitting the data into
sub samples which indicates that China may converge to different steady states. The policy
implication is that regional disparity is created by the strategy of allowing selected areas to
develop one step ahead. So, it's time to help the laggards to improve their productivity to
balance the regional economic development and maintain the social stability. The West and
Central areas of China should be granted the same privilege that the economic zones have
to attract more foreign investment and domestic investment, and invest much more capital
in education as they did in well developed area.
In Chapter 3 we adopt a regional panel data approach to investigate the relationship be-
tween unemployment and growth in China during the period 1997-2006. First, we test
whether the Okun's law holds in China. With the market-oriented reform progressed, the
law is found to hold only in Eastern and Central China. More generally, we nd the un-
employment level in China remains moderate. The Aghion and Blanchard (1994) model
suggests an intermediate level of unemployment is necessary to achieve the optimal speed
of transition that would maximize the total output. Our empirical estimates suggest that the
current unemployment rate in China is indeed close to the optimal unemployment rate. Un-
employment is thus the price that China needs to pay for the future prosperity. However,
China is a large country with more than 1.3 billion populations and with a growing re-
gional disparity in economic development. Base on the empirical study of the relationship
between growth rate and unemployment rate at regional level, it indicates that excessive
state rm closures in Eastern China may slow down job creation in the private sector and
undermine social stability. In contrast, the process of winding down and transforming in-
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efcient state rms in Western China should be accelerated, and this would facilitate the
development of the private sector and promote the transition progress.
In Chapter 4 we attempt to investigate the changing nature of economic integration among
Chinese provinces and explain the interprovincial correlations of supply and demand shocks
with a host of economic variables. The observation period covers ve decades: from the
communist take-over, through the upheavals of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Rev-
olution, to the economic liberalization and opening up to the outside world and the rapid
growth that this has generated. The results show that Chinese provinces encounter increas-
ingly symmetric demand shocks whereas supply shocks are becoming more asymmetric
over time. This is potentially worrying: supply shocks leave behind permanent effects
while demand shocks are only temporary in nature. If Chinese provinces are subject to
increasingly divergent permanent shocks, this may translate into growing economic and
political tensions in the future. We are unable to explain the comovement of business cy-
cles during the Maoist period, especially during its early part, 1955-1965. This is perhaps
not surprising, given that this period was dominated by politically-induced shocks. For
the reform period, coastal provinces and those with higher xed asset investment are char-
acterized by higher correlation of supply shocks. Rather surprisingly, little evidence can
be found that inward FDI (the factor associated with fuelling Chinese growth) and s-
cal/administrative decentralization affect the synchronisation of demand or supply shocks.
In my study, one of the important and obvious causes of the increasing regional disparity
is the Coastal Development Strategy. Central government neglected the interior regions
while focusing on supporting investment in the coastal regions. The initial priority given
to coastal development was motivated by the coastal region's natural advantages for global
transport and communication. This made it much more convenient and easier to attract for-
eign direct investment. In turn, the inows of foreign direct helped the coastal provinces
get ahead of the rest of China: there is strong evidence that foreign direct investment is a
crucial factor leading to higher economic growth rates. It was expected that by supporting
the coastal region and letting some people and some regions get rich rst, the spill-over
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effect from growth centers would gradually help the rest of economy to expand as well.
However, this strategy has eventually resulted in the interior region lagging far behind the
coastal region. Regional disparity is not only an economic challenge but also a political
one. China is composed of 56 ethnic groups and most of ethnic minority people live in the
far west region which is among the least developed areas. The widening of regional dispar-
ity may therefore also undermine social stability. The central government has realized the
urgency and importance and has made enormous effort to control regional disparities. Zhu
Rongji government launched the Western Development Strategy in 1998. North-East
Revival Strategy was implemented in 2003. In 2006, Wen Jiabao government initiated the
Rise of Central China program to speed up the development of central areas and to attain
well balanced regional development. The interior regions of China will certainly bene-
t from these development policies by the development of infrastructure (government-led
investment), creating a more stable environment to bring in foreign investment and promo-
tion of education. Nevertheless, with the economy being gradually liberalized, the market
economy mechanism has become rmly established in China. The effectiveness of the de-
velopment policies initiated by both Zhu and Wen falls short of Deng's open door policy
and special economic zone policy. Harmonious society is the goal of current Chinese
leadership and Hu and Wen's governments have paid substantial attention to regional dis-
parity. They issued many preferential policies to encourage excellent teachers/graduates to
go to the countryside especially in the West since human capital is another important factor
leading to higher economic growth rates. They stressed the importance of teachers' quality
for closing the gap between rural and urban areas. It is not clear whether the less developed
regions can nally catch up with the rapidly-growing coastal region. However, my empiri-
cal study based on augmented Solowmodel found that convergence in per capita production
across China's provinces from 1978-2008 is conditional on physical investment, employ-
ment growth, human capital investment and foreign direct investment. This suggests that
factor accumulation in the interior regions will eventually lead to convergence in incomes.
Continued extensive reform will further help the process of convergence.
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In future research, several lines can be suggested. Firstly, the rural-urban disparity is an-
other form of disparity in China: there is often large income differential between urban
and rural regions even within the same province. This issue should receive more attention
in the future. Secondly, an important question is whether reducing regional inequality and
maintaining high economic growth can be achieved at the same time. Will it undermine
economic efciency? Inequality is bad for social stability but there is another saying that in
some way also positive to economic growth (Gravier-Rymaszewskaet et al., 2010). There-
fore, studying the growth-inequality nexus in China will be very useful and important.
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